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INTRODUCION
Many feminist theorists and advocates argue that numerous types
of violent crime against women should be characterized as "hate
crime"; that is, crime motivated by a hatred of women and a desire to
control and terrorize women.1 As early as 1975, Susan Brownmiller
1. See CENTER FOR WOMEN POLY STUDIES, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AS BIAS MOTIVATED
HATE CRIME: DEFINING THE ISSUES 1 (1991) (stating that "[t~hroughout these past two decades,
feminist theorists have written extensively about violence against women, which is seen as the
quintessential example of sex discrimination and sexual oppression-as the most powerful tool
of male domination and patriarchal control"). The Center for Women Policy Studies relies on
the following works to support its proposition: SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN,
WOMEN, AND RAPE 14-15 (1975) (stating that "[m]an's discovery that his genitalia could serve
as a weapon to generate fear must rank as one of the most important discoveries of prehistoric
times, along with the use of fire and the first crude stone axe"); CATHARINE A. MACINNON,
TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 245 (1989) [hereinafter MACKINNON, THEORY OF THE
STATE] (asserting that the rape of women by men "is integral to the way inequality between the
sexes occurs in life. Intimate violation with impunity is an ultimate index of social power. Rape
both evidences and practices women's low status relative to men.... Threat of sexual assault
is threat of punishment for being female."); KATE MILLETr, SEXUAL POLmCS 25, 44 (1970)
(claiming that "[i]n rape, the emotions of aggression, hatred, contempt, and the desire to break
or violate personality, take a form consummately appropriate to sexual politics"); and Charlotte
Bunch, Women's Rights as Human Rights: Toward a Re-Vtsion of Human Rights, 12 HUM. RTS. Q. 486,
486 (1990) (arguing that gender-related abuse should be incorporated into human rights goals
and that "many violations of women's human rights are distinctly connected to being
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argued that rape is not a crime of sex, but rather a crime of violence
that preserves male dominance and keeps all women in a state of
terror.' This same analysis of violence against women is applied in
the context of domestic violence? Studies show that victims of rape
female-that is, women are discriminated against and abused on the basis of gender").
2. Brownmiller defines rape as "a conscious process of intimidation by which all men keep
all women in a state of fear." BROWNMILLER, supra note 1, at 15 (emphasis in original).
Catharine MacKinnon argues that "[r]ape is an act of dominance over women that works
systemically to maintain a gender-stratified society in which women occupy a disadvantaged status
as the appropriate victims and targets of sexual aggression." Catharine A. MacKinnon, Rejections
onSexEquality UnderLaw, 100YALEL.J. 1281,1302 (1991) [hereinafter MacKinnon, SexEqualiy];
accord MACKINNON, THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 1, at 126 (asserting that dominance and
submission between women and men is eroticized, placing women in a dangerous position in
relation to men); Susan Griffin, Rape: The All-American Crime 10 RAMPARTS 26, 27 (1971)
(emphasizing that all women are victims of rape even if they have not experienced a direct
attack because "'rape and the fear of rape are a daily part of every woman's consciousness'"),
quoted in Patricia L.N. Donat &John D'Emilio, A Feminist Redefinition of Rape and Sexual Assault:
Historical Foundations and Change 48J. Soc. ISSUES 9, 15 (1992).
Dr.JoAnn Evans-Gardner, a founder of the Association for Women in Psychology, asserts that
rape is "an act of political oppression," and that "[r]apists perform for sexist males the same
function that the Ku Klux Klan performed for racist whites-they keep women in their 'place'
through fear." NANCY GAGER & CATHLEEN SCHURR, SEXUAL ASSAULT: CONFRONTING RAPE IN
AMERIcA 209 (1976); accord MacKnnon, Sex Equality, supra at 1303 (stating that "sexual assault
in the United States today resembles lynching prior to its recognition as a civil rights violation").
However, some African-American feminists argue that these theories about the functions of
rape have been developed by caucasian feminists in response to their own particular experience
of rape. See infra notes 162-196 and accompanying text (discussing the argument that
mainstream feminism is essentialist). But see BELL HOOKS, Reflecions on Race and Sex, in
YEARNING 57,59 (1990) ("both groups [caucasian men and African-American men] have been
socialized to condone patriarchal affirmation of rape as an acceptable way to maintain male
domination. It is the merging of sexuality with male domination within patriarchy that informs
the construction of masculinity for men of all race and classes.").
3. See Edward W. Gondolf, Anger and Oppression in Men Who Batter. Empiricist and Feminist
Perspectives and Their Implications forResearch, 10 VIcTIMOLOGY: AN INT'LJ. 311 (1985). Gondolf
asserts that "feminist researchers... analyze abuse as an expression of patriarchy. Men abuse
women in the home as they do elsewhere in our society-as a means of maintaining power and
exerting control over women. Wife abuse in this light is a kind of gender terrorism." Id. at 313.
Gondolf further states that
feminists... consider male oppression to be fundamental to violence against women.
The individual batterer abuses his wife not so much to release his anger as he has been
taught to do, as the empiricists imply, but rather, for the same reason men exploit
women in the larger society and have beaten and discriminated against them
throughout history--to keep them in their place .... The man then uses abuse not
to relieve or release anger but to exert his power and privilege.
Id. at 316.
Professor Elizabeth Schneider makes the same argument when she states that "[t]raditionally,
feminist work on battering identified battering as a problem of sexism, of male domination
within heterosexual relationships, shaped by the institution of marriage." Elizabeth M.
Schneider, Particularity and Generality: Challenges of Feminist Theory and Practice in Work on Woman-
Abuse; 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 520, 539 (1992). She further notes that feminists have challenged "the
traditional interpretive frameworks used by psychologists" in the field of wife-battering, and in
doing so "have drawn analogies between battered women and other victims of terrorism." Id.
at 541 n.81; see also Michele Bograd, Feminist Perspectives on Wfe Abuse: An Introduction, in FEMINIST
PERSPECTIVES ON WIFE ABUSE 11, 14 (Kersti Yllo & Michele Bograd eds., 1988) (stating that
"[even] if individual men refrain from employing physical force against their partners, men as
a class benefit from how women's lives are restricted and limited because of their fear of
violence by husbands and lovers as well as strangers").
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and domestic violence, like victims of other hate crimes, are inter-
changeable in the eyes of their attackers.4 Moreover, violent crimes
against women are frequently devoid of any criminal motive and are
excessively violent.5 In similar fashion, advocates for victims of
violent crimes motivated by racial and ethnic hatred argue that the
intent of such hate-based crimes is to control and terrorize the
members of racial and ethnic groups.6 These crimes also lack
criminal motive7 and are excessively violent.8
Despite the similarities between race and ethnic hate-based crimes
and violence against women, the development of the law concerning
the two types of crimes has differed considerably. While many
feminist theorists and women's rights advocates adopt the perspective
that violence against women is often hate crime,9 they have generally
failed to have gender included in hate crime statutes.'" Advocates
for victims of ethnic, racial, and other hate-based violence, on the
other hand, have successfully promoted legislation that treats such
violent crimes differently from other violent crimes through the
inclusion of these crimes in hate crime statutes."
This article explores the legal and political issues surrounding the
inclusion of gender in hate crime statutes. Part I discusses hate crime
statutes in general and the constitutional constraints on the types of
behavior that these statutes cover. Part II describes federal and state
4. SeeElaineHilbermanOverview:The"Wift Beater ';Wfe"Reconsidered137AM.J.PSYCHIATRY
1336, 1337 (1980) (arguing that "[t]he basic fact of the victim's femaleness is used by the
offender to justify the assault"); Hate Crime Statistics Act of 1988: Hearing on S. 2000 Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on theJudiciary, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 262, 268
(1988) (testimony of Molly Yard, President, National Organization for Women) [hereinafter
Yard testimony] (stating that "in the eyes of the rapist, one woman could stand in for any
other").
5. See CENTER FOR WOMEN POuCY STUDIES, supra note 1, at 10 (explaining that "[miany
crimes against women involve excessive violence, including mutilation, that characterizes bias-
motivated hate crimes"); Peter Finn, Bias Crime: A Special Target for Prosecutors, THE PROSECUTOR,
Spring 1988, at 9, 13 (explaining that crimes are identified as bias-motivated by considering the
"severity of the attack (e.g., mutilation)").
6. See Peter Finn, supra note 5, at 10 (asserting that "crimes motivated by bias have a far
more pervasive impact... because they are intended to intimidate an entire group") (emphasis in
original).
7. See Finn, supra note 5, at 13-14 (stating that "[w]ith some hate violence incidents there
seem to be no innocent victims-everyone appears compromised").
8. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
9. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text (citing to proponents of the argument that
violent crime against women is based upon the attacker's desire to control and intimidate
women as a group).
10. See infra notes 110-137 and accompanying text (discussing the opposition of national
advocacy groups to the inclusion of gender in hate crime statutes).
11. See infra notes 11-27 and accompanying text (discussing legislative efforts on the state
and federal level to fight hate crime); see infra note 110 and accompanying text (discussing the




hate crime legislation that includes gender. Part Ill examines the
obstacles to the passage and implementation of these laws and the
arguments against treating violence against women as hate crime.
Part IV analyzes two potential benefits to treating violence against
women as hate crime. The article concludes that these potential
benefits outweigh the concerns raised in Part III, and that therefore
women's advocacy groups should promote both the inclusion of
gender in hate crime statutes and the effective implementation of
these statutes.
I. GUIDANCE FROM EXISTING LAW
A. Hate Crime Statutes In General
1. Federal Law
For over a century, the American legal system has recognized that
individual members of some groups are the targets of violence merely
because of their membership in a specific group. The Ku Klux Klan
Act of 1871,12 passed in response to violence against African-Ameri-
cans following the Civil War and arguably the first federal hate crime
statute, was the first federal effort to combat attacks motivated by a
person's membership in a particular group.1' Since the passage of
this statute, federal hate crime statutes have expanded the scope of
federal protection to include racial, religious, and ethnic minori-
ties. 4 These statutes impose criminal penalties and/or civil reme-
dies.
12. Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985-
1986 (1988)) (attempting to curtail the violence against African-American citizens from the Ku
Klux Klan).
13. See S. REP. No. 197, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1991) (stating that Congress first barred
discriminatory "attacks against persons because of their race, religion or political beliefs" in
1871).
14. For example, the following federal statutes provide criminal sanctions for those
convicted of violating a person's civil rights on the basis of the person's race, religion, or
ethnicity. These statutes address: (1) conspiracy to interfere with civil rights, 18 U.S.C. § 241
(1988); (2) deprivation of civil rights under color of law, 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1988); (3) forcible
interference with civil rights, 18 U.S.C. § 245 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); and (4) willful
interference with civil rights under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3631 (1988). Although
three statutes cover private acts, one requires a conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. § 241, and one is restricted
to the housing context, 42 U.S.C. § 3631. Furthermore, the statute that addresses forcible
interference with civil rights protects only specific civil rights: voting and election activities;
participation in programs administered or financed by the United States; federal employment;
and jury service in the federal courts. 18 U.S.C. § 245.
Additionally, at least four federal statutes offer civil remedies for victims of civil rights
violations that are based upon the victim's race, religion, or ethnicity. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988)
(prohibiting an individual from depriving another person of equal protection of the law); 42
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2. State Law
A majority of states have enacted hate crime statutes.'- Many
states provide for both criminal penalties and civil remedies in cases
of hate crime. 6 Some states require data collection on hate
crime. 7 Others train their police to handle hate crime cases.' 8
Most importantly, state hate crime statutes extend protection to
several traditionally disadvantaged groups not protected by federal
U.S.C. § 1985 (1988) (prohibiting two or more individuals from conspiring to deprive any
person or class of persons of equal protection of the law); 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (1988) (providing
a cause of action against any person who fails to prevent a conspiracy that deprives another
person of his civil rights, where the person charged with violating the statute also has the power
to prevent the commission of the conspiracy); 42 U.S.C. § 3617 (1988) (providing a cause of
action for victims of interference, coercion, or intimidation in violation of the Fair Housing Act).
See generally NATIONAL INSTITUTE AGAINST PREJUDICE AND VIOLENCE, STRIKING BACK AT BIGOTRY:
REMEDIES UNDER FEDERAL AND STATE LAW FOR VIOLENCE MOTIVATED BY RACIAL, RELIGIOUS AND
ETHNIC PREJUDICE 23-37 (1986) (discussing federal hate crime remedies, with a particular
concentration on the legal remedies for violence motivated by race and religion).
15. The following hate crime statutes are in force: CAL. PENAL CODE § 422.6 (West Supp.
1993); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-121 (Supp. 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-58 (West 1986);
D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-4001 (1992); FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 877.19 (Harrison 1991); IDAHO CODE
§ 18-7902 (1987); ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-7.1 (Smith-Hurd 1992); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 729A.2 (West 1993); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15.331 (Baldwin 1992); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 25,
§ 1544 (West 1988); MD. CODE ANN. art. 27, § 470A (1987 & Supp. 1991); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 22C, § 32 (West 1992); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 28.257 (West 1991); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 609.2231(4) (West Supp. 1993); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 574.090 (Vernon 1992); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 45-5-221 (1991); NEV. REV. STAT. § 207.185 (1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651:6(g)
(1955 & Supp. 1992); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:12-1(b)7e (West 1982 & Supp. 1993); N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 240.30 (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-401.14 (1992); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2927.12 (Anderson 1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 850 (West 1993); OR. REV.
STAT. § 166.155, .165 (1991); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2710 (1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-1-35, 11-
42-3 (1992); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-309 (1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-203.3 (Supp. 1993);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1455 (Supp. 1990); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-42.1 (Michie 1992); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.080 (Supp. 1993); W. VA. CODE § 61-6-21 (1992); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 939.645 (West 1992).
16. The following hate crime statutes include both criminal and civil penalties: D.C. CODE
ANN. § 22-4003, -4004 (1992); FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 775.085 (Harrison 1992); IDAHO CODE § 18-
7903 (1987); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 716.7A, 729A.5 (West 1993); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN.
§ 750.147b (West 1991); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.190 (1991); RI. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-1-35, 11-42-3
(1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 1455, 1457 (Supp. 1990).
17. The following statutes require the collection of hate crime statistics: CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 29-27m (West 1986); D.C. CODE ANN. § 224002 (1992); FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 877.19
(Harrison 1991); IDAHO CODE § 18-7902 (1987); IOWA CODE ANN. § 729A.2 (West 1993); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 17.1523 (Baldwin 1992); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 1544 (West 1988); MD.
CODE ANN. art. 88B, § 9 (1991); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 22C, §§ 32-35 (West 1992); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 28.257 (West 1991); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.5531 (West Supp. 1994); OR.
REV. STAT. § 181.550 (1991); RI. GEN. LAWS § 44-28-46 (1992); TEX. GOV'T CODEANN. § 441.046
(West Supp. 1993).
18. The following statutes mandate special police training for dealing with hate crimes:
IOWA CODE ANN. § 80B.11 (West 1984 & Supp. 1993); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15.331 (Baldwin
1992); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 6, § 116B (West 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.8451 (West
Supp. 1993).
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hate crime statutes, such as gays and lesbians,19 women," the
mentally and physically disabled, the elderly,22 and members of
unpopular political groups.2" The inclusion of such groups is a
direct response to changing attitudes about who can be a victim of
hate crime. Today, most hate crime originates not with organized
hate groups such as the Ku Klux Klan, but instead with "individuals
or small groups of people acting on their own." 4 By broadening the
definition of the hate crime perpetrator, the definitions of hate crime
and the hate crime victim are broadened as well.
Over half of all state hate crime statutes are based on, or are similar
to, the model hate crime statute developed by the Anti-Defamation
League of B'nai B'rith (ADL) in 1981.' The distinctive feature of
this statute is its enhancement of penalties for criminal activities when
the victim is a member of a protected group and the perpetrator
19. The following hate crime statutes include sexual orientation as a protected characteris-
tic: CAL. PENAL CODE § 422.6 (West Supp. 1993); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-4001 (1992); ILL ANN.
STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-7.1 (Smith-Hurd 1992); IOWA CODE ANN. § 729A.2 (West 1993); MAss.
GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 22C, § 32 (West Supp. 1992); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 28.257 (West
1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.2231(4) (West Supp. 1993); NEV. REV. STAT. § 207.185 (1991);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6 5 1:6 (g) (1955 & Supp. 1992); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:12-1(b)7e (West
1982 & Supp. 1993); OR. REV. STAT. § 166.165 (1991); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1455 (Supp.
1990); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 939.645 (West 1992).
20. The following hate crime statutes include gender as a protected characteristic: CAL.
PENAL CODE § 422.6 (West Supp. 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-58 (West 1986); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 22-4001 (1992); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-7.1 (Smith-Hurd 1992); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 729A.2 (West 1993); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15.331 (Baldwin 1992); MICH. COMP.
LAWSANN. § 28.257 (West 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.2231(4) (West Supp. 1993); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 6 5 1:6(g) (1955 & Supp. 1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tiL 13, § 1455 (Supp. 1990); W. VA.
CODE § 61-6-21 (1992).
21. The following hate crime statutes include physical and/or mental disability as a
protected characteristic: CAL. PENAL CODE § 422.6 (West Supp. 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 46a-58 (West 1986); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-4001 (1992); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-7.1
(Smith-Hurd 1992); IOWA CODE ANN. § 729A.2 (West 1993); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 22C,
§ 32 (West 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.2231(4) (West Supp. 1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN., tiL 21,
§ 850 (West 1992-1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1455 (Supp. 1990); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9A.36.080 (1988 & Supp. 1993); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 939.645 (West 1992).
22. The following hate crime statutes include age as a protected characteristic: D.C. CODE
ANN. § 22-4001 (1992); IOWA CODE ANN. § 729A.2 (West 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.2231(4)
(West Supp. 1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tiL 13, § 1455 (1990).
23. The following hate crime statutes include political affiliation as a protected
characteristic: D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-4001 (1992); IOWA CODE ANN. § 729A.2 (West 1993); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 45-5-221 (1991); W. VA. CODE § 61-6-21 (1992).
24. Finn, supra note 5, at 9. In fact, "at least half" of all people who are arrested for bias
crimes are between the ages of 16 and 25. Id. at 9-10. These individual perpetrators of hate
crime may be encouraged by the rhetoric of hate groups and by the lack of an effective
community response to hate crime. Id. at 9.
25. SeeANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE OF B'NAI B'RfTH, HATE CRiMES STATUTES: A 1991 STATUS
REPORT 2-5 (1991) (setting forth model hate crime legislation intended to assist state and local
legislatures that are considering enacting hate crime laws). The ADL stated that over half of
all state hate crime statutes are based upon, or similar to, the ADL model statute. Id. at 1.
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commits the crime because of the victim's membership in this
group. 26  Like federal hate crime statutes, the ADL model statute
also provides civil remedies for victims of hate crime.
2 7
B. Enforcement Of Hate Cime Statutes In Race Cases
In general, the enforcement of hate crime statutes is problematic.
The same prejudices that motivate people to commit hate crime may
also influence the decisions of prosecutors and the actions of the
police2 To combat these prejudices while assisting the enforcement
of hate crime statutes, some jurisdictions have created special police
and prosecutorial units that deal solely with hate crime cases. 9
Some of these special units coordinate police and prosecutorial
action," while others work directly with the community organizations
of statutorily-protected groups.31 Although data is limited, it appears
that hate crime statutes are most effectively enforced in jurisdictions
with these special units.32 When the police know that they have
community support and that prosecutors will actually prosecute hate
26. Id. at 2 (concluding that prosecutors would be more inclined to pursue convictions
under hate crime statutes if the penalties were increased).
27. Id. at 3. In the ADL model statute, civil remedies include general tort damages,
punitive damages, and attorney's fees. Id. In addition, the model ADL statute makes parents
liable for their children's actions. Id.
28. See Finn, supra note 5, at 10 (stating that a "[1]ack of police and prosecutor attention
to bias crime sometimes reflects the attitudes of local residents who do not want minorities in
their community"); Tanya Katerf Hernindez, Note, Bias Ciimes: Unconsdou Racism in the
Prosecution of "Racially Motivated Wtokene , 99 YALE UJ. 845, 851-55 (1990) (stating that
"unconscious racism, ingrained in North American culture, makes it difficult for prosecutors to
concede that racially motivated violence is indeed a crime").
29. See Finn, supra note 5, at 11-12. For example, in New York City, the Manhattan District
Attorney's office has appointed a senior trial attorney to supervise cases involving crimes against
gays and lesbians. Id. at 12. Sensitivity training regarding the unique problems of gay and
lesbian crime victims is mandatory for new District Attorneys. Id. Prosecutors are to
recommend the highest offense possible for persons charged with the commission of a bias
crime and are to urge the judge to consider the bias when passing sentence. Id.
30. For example, the Queens County, NewYork, District Attorney's office has created an
Anti-Bias Bureau that works through the Police Department's Bias Incident Investigating Unit.
Finn, supra note 5, at 11-12. The Unit monitors and investigates hate violence that is allegedly
based upon the victim's race, religion, ethnicity, or sexual orientation. Id. at 11. The Anti-Bias
Bureau follows up with legal action where appropriate. Id. at 11. Very few of these bias cases
are plea-bargained. Id. at 12.
In Boston, Massachusetts, the Police Department's Community Disorders Unit aggressively
pursues bias-crime investigations, including ride-alongs with victims, surveillance, rapid response
operation, and undercover operations. I. Once satisfied that a hate crime has occurred, the
case is forwarded directly to the Attorney General's Civil Rights Division for prosecution. Id.
31. For instance, a paralegal in the Manhattan, NewYork, DistrictAttorney's Office also acts
as a liaison to the gay and lesbian community. Finn, supra note 5, at 12.
32. In spite of the difficulties inherent in hate-crime investigation, the successes
encountered by those states which have created special units suggests that "targeting these cases
is both feasible and rewarding." Finn, supra note 5, at 14. For example, in 1986, Boston's
Community Disorders Unit brought 155 charges, 93 criminal and 62 civil, and convicted nearly
90% of those charged. Id. at 12.
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crime cases, the police have a strong incentive to treat hate crime
seriously."3 Unfortunately, mostjurisdictions are not devoting special
efforts to prosecuting hate crime.'
In addition, there are two particular problems with the enforcement
of race-based hate crime statutes. First, caucasians appear to be using
these statutes in surprisingly high numbers. For instance, in
Minnesota, 49% of the victims who reported hate crimes between
1988 and 1991 were caucasian. 5 Some advocates maintain that hate
crime statutes should only be available to minority victims.3 6 The
justification offered for this position is that hate-motivated violence
against caucasians has less impact on the individual and the communi-
ty than hate-motivated violence does against members of racial and
ethnic minorities.
3 7
Second, racial and other biases among prosecutors is believed to be
a primary obstacle to the use of these statutes by minorities." Two
proposed solutions include revising the statute to create a presump-
tion of racist motivation in all interracial crimes of violence 9 and
33. Finn, supra note 5, at 15 (stating that "unless it becomes office policy for all trial
assistants to single out hate violence, police may stop arresting suspects for these offenses when
equally aggressive prosecutorial action does not follow").
34. Finn, supra note 5, at 15.
35. MINNESOTA BOARD OF PEACE OFFICER STANDARDS AND TRAINING, BIAS MOTIVATED
CRIMEs:ASuMMARYREPoRTOFMINNESOTA'SRESPONSE38 (1990) [hereinafter SUMMARYREPORT]
(noting that 49% and 51% of the victims of hate crimes in 1988 and 1989, respectively, were
caucasian); Minnesota Department of Public Safety, Minnesota Bias Offense Summary 1990-1991
(1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The American UniversityJournalof Gender & theLaw)
[hereinafter Bias Offense Summary] (noting that 48% of hate crime victims in both 1990 and
1991 were caucasian).
36. See Marc L. Fleischauer, Comment, Teeth for a Paper Tiger A Proposal to Add Enforceability
to Rorida's Hate Crimes Ac, 17 FLA. ST. U. L REV. 697, 703, 706 (1990) (proposing that minority
offenders be exempted from penalty enhancements and civil damages in racially motivated
crimes).
37. See Hernfindez, supra note 28, at 861 (arguing that "white victims may feel threatened
by criminals who happen to be people of color, but this is a concern to be distinguished from
the fear of bias motivated attacks which contributes to the oppression of disfavored groups").
In the case of hate speech involving civil action, not criminal, advocates argue that expressions
of hatred directed against members of historically dominant-groups are not the same as hate
speech directed at a member of a historically subordinate group because the latter keeps "victim
groups in an inferior position." Man Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the
Victim's Stoiy, 87 MIcH. L. REV. 2320, 2362 (1989).
38. Hemndez, supra note 28, at 851-52 (arguing that the lack of enforcement of state hate
crime statutes is a result of "unchecked prosecutorial discretion," which is greatly affected by
"unconscious racism of prosecutors"); Note, Combatting Racial Violence: A Legislative Proposal 101
HARV. L. REV. 1270, 1275 (1988) (stating that prosecutors have wide discretion and can use their
own racist sentiment to find that a criminal act was not racially motivated).
39. See Fleischauer, supra note 36, at 704 (proposing that the state legislatures create a
presumption of bias in their hate crime statutes, while simultaneously creating an affirmative
defense that places the burden on the defendant to prove that his actions were not racially-
motivated); Note, supra note 38, at 1275 (concluding that the "Constitution permits states...
to shift to the defendant the burden of proving a lack of racial motivation").
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creating mechanisms for monitoring and challenging prosecutorial
discretion.'
II. LEGISLATION THAT TREATS VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AS HATE
CRIME
A. Federal Legislation
The only federal statute that offers remedies to victims of violent
acts that are motivated by gender bias is Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.41 This statute only applies to cases of discrimination in
an employment setting.42 Congress, however, is currently consider-
ing the enactment of several pieces of legislation-the Violence
Against Women Act of 1993 and the Hate Crimes Sentencing
Enhancement Act of 1993-which would define bias-motivated crimes
based upon the victim's gender as a type of hate crime.
1. The Violence Against Women Act of 1993
The Violence Against Women Act of 1993 (VAWA)43 was intro-
duced in the Senate in January 1993 by Senator Joseph Biden 4  A
companion bill' was also introduced in the House of Representa-
tives by Representative Patricia Schroeder in February 1993.46 As
amended, the bills share a number of important provisions.4
Among other things, both provide federal funding to improve
40. One commentator recommends that each state establish a Bias Reporting Agency to aid
in regulating prosecutorial discretion. Hernndez, supra note 28, at 855. This agency, among
other things, would require a "mandatory justification process" for prosecutors who plea
bargained or failed to prosecute a bias crime case. Id. at 856. It would also assist victims who
wished to challenge a prosecutor's decision not to prosecute a case. Id. at 856-58. The agency
could also bring a class action against individual prosecutors who displayed a pattern of not
prosecuting bias crimes. Id. at 860.
41. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-716, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. III 1991)).
42. Id. § 703, 78 Stat. at 255 (prohibiting unlawful employment practices that result in
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, gender, or national origin).
43. S. 11, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
44. 139 CONG. REc. S190, 5345 (daily ed.Jan. 21, 1993). As of the time that this article was
written, the bill had been favorably reported by the Senate Judiciary Committee as amended,
139 CONG. REc. D597 (daily ed. May 27, 1993), and submitted to the Senate for consideration,
id. at S11,444 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1993).
45. H.R. 1133, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
46. 139 CONG. REC. H877, E450 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1993). As of the time that this article
was written, the bill had passed the House of Representatives by a voice vote, id. at H10,370
(daily ed. Nov. 20, 1993), and was awaiting consideration by the Senate Judiciary Committee,
id. at S16,935 (daily ed. Nov. 22, 1993) (referring the bill to committee).
47. The amended version of the Senate bill may be found in the Senate Judiciary
Committee's Report, S. REP. No. 138, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 2-37 (1993). Similarly, the amended
version of the House bill is located in the House Judiciary Committee's Report, H.R. REP. NO.
395, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-24 (1993).
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criminal law enforcement; implement pro-arrest policies in domes-
tic violence cases;49 authorize education and training programs for
judges of state and federal courts;"0 create a United States Depart-
ment of Justice Task Force on Violence Against Women;5' establish
new federal criminal penalties for domestic violence;5 2 and require
that financial restitution be made to victims by their attackers when
their attackers are convicted of federal sex offenses.5 3
In addition, the Senate bill contains several additional remedies
that are not included in the House bill. First, Title III of the bill54
allows for the recovery of damages55 under federal civil rights law for
violent crimes that are motivated by the victim's gender.5" The
effect of this provision is to offer women something entirely new-a
federal civil rights remedy that is available outside of the employment
setting." Second, the Senate bill contains penalty increase and
48. S. 11, § 121 (authorizing grants to combat violent crimes against women through
increased training of police officers and development of law enforcement programs specifically
designed for fighting these crimes); H.R. 1133, §§ 126, 1701-1704 (authorizing grants to
"develop law enforcement and prosecution strategies to combat violent crimes against women").
49. S. 11, §§ 231, 317; H.R. 1133, §§ 221, 1901-1904.
50. S. 11, §§ 501, 511-514, 521-522 (authorizing grants to train state judges on gender-
motivated bias crimes, as well as grants to study gender bias in the federal courts); H.R. 1133,
§§ 401-404, 411-412 (using the same language as the Senate bill).
51. S. 11, §§ 141-148; H.R 1133, §§ 311-319. The purpose of the Task Force is to develop
strategies for combatting and punishing violent crimes against women. S. 11, § 142; H.R. 1133,
§ 312.
52. S. 11, § 221 (creating new penalties for interstate domestic violence where a spouse or
intimate partner is injured); H.R. 1133, § 211 (punishing interstate domestic violence where the
victim suffers bodily injury).
53. S. 11, § 113; H.R 1133, § 131.
54. S. 11, §§ 301-304.
55. Id. §§ 302(c), 303 (allowing the victim to recover compensatory and punitive damages,
declaratory and injunctive relief, and attorney's fees, among other remedies).
56. Id. § 302 (c). The term "motivated by gender" is borrowed from existing civil rights law,
specifically, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17, which
prohibits employment discrimination because of sex. See S. REP. No. 138, supra note 47, at 52-
53.
57. S. 11, § 302(a) (2) (stating a Congressional finding that "current law provides a civil
rights remedy for gender crimes committed in the workplace, but not for gender crimes
committed on the street or in the home").
However, certain organizations have voiced concerns about the potential impact of Title III
on other civil rights laws. For example, Brenda Smith of the National Women's Law Center
stated that, hypothetically, if the bill were to pass with a provision requiring a higher standard
of proof for demonstrating gender bias, such as that the crime must be "overwhelmingly"
because of gender bias, then perhaps there would be an attempt to move this standard over to
other kinds of cases, such as employment discrimination. Telephone Interview with Brenda V.
Smith, Senior Staff Attorney, National Women's Law Center (July 6, 1992). This issue is
specifically addressed in October 1991 SenateJudiciary Committee Report, which states that the
term "overwhelmingly" was specifically eliminated from the 1991 bill because there was "no
counterpart to such language in any other civil rights remedy." See S. REP. No. 197, supra note
13, at 51 (stating additionally that such a term would "pose an unnecessary and harmful burden
on women"); see also S. REP. No. 138, supra note 47, at 53 (noting that the 1993 bill does not
require a higher standard of proof than in other civil rights cases and that it is not intended to
undermine existing civil rights laws). As Ms. Smith suggested, however, the bill theoretically
19941
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enhancement provisions for certain defendants who are convicted of
sexual assault.
58
2. The Hate Crimes Sentencing Enhancement Act of 1993
Another recent effort to combat hate crimes on the federal level is
the Hate Crimes Sentencing Enhancement Act of 1993 (HCSEA), 9
introduced in the House of Representatives by Representative Charles
Schumer in March 1993.6o A companion bill61 was also introduced
in the Senate by Senator Dianne Feinstein in October 1993.62 Both
the House bill as amended, and the Senate bill, direct the United
States Sentencing Commission to create and/or amend guidelines to
provide sentencing enhancements for hate crime.6' Hate crime is
defined in both bills as one in which the defendant intentionally
"selects a victim.., because of the [victim's] actual or perceived race,
color, religion, national origin, ethnicity, gender, or sexual orientation
... ." The sentencing enhancements are to raise an offense by at
least three "severity" levels, increasing, on average, the actual time
served by one-third.'
It is expected that both of these bills will be able to withstand any
challenges to their constitutionality. In Wisconsin v. Mitchell,66 the
U.S. Supreme Court recently upheld a Wisconsin hate crime statute
that enhances criminal penalties where the defendant intentionally
selects a victim based upon certain protected characteristics of the
could be amended to include a higher standard of proof.
58. S. 11, § 111 (increasing the prison term of a repeat sex offender up to twice that which
is otherwise authorized); i&L § 112 (directing the U.S. Sentencing Commission to enhance
penalties for persons who are convicted of aggravated sexual abuse).
However, as discussed in Part H of this article, the bill's progress has been stalled in part
because of concerns expressed by women's rights and other organizations about these
provisions. See infra notes 144-161 (discussing the objections made by some organizations to
increasing penalties for sex offenses).
59. H.R. 1152, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
60. 139 CONG. REc. H911 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 1993). As of the time that this article was
written, the bill had passed the House of Representatives by a voice vote, id. at H6795-96 (daily
ed. Sept. 21, 1993), and was awaiting consideration by the Senate Judiciary Committee, id. at
S12,241 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1993) (referring the bill to committee).
61. S. 1522, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
62. 139 CONG. REC. S13,172, S13,175-77 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1993). As of the time that this
article was written the bill was awaiting consideration by the Senate Judiciary Committee. See
id. (referring the bill to committee).
63. S. 1522, § 2(b); H.R. 1152, § 2(a).
64. S. 1522, § 2(a); H.R, 1152, § 2(b). To date, it appears that there has been no
controversy surrounding the inclusion of gender as a protected characteristic in the bill.
However, the only women's organization that has endorsed the bill is the National Council of
Jewish Women. List of Groups Supporting the Hate Crimes Sentencing Enhancement Act (as
of Mar. 12, 1993) (on file with The American UniversityJoumal of Gender & the Law).
65. H.R. REP. No. 244, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1993).
66. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, - U.S. -, 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993).
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victim, such as race.6 7 The language of the penalty enhancement
clause of the Wisconsin statute is substantially similar to that of the
Senate and amended House bills.'u Wisconsin v. Mitchell is consistent
with the opinions expressed during the July 1992 hearing held by the
Subcommittee on Crime and Criminal Justice of the House Commit-
tee on the Judiciary concerning the constitutionality of penalty
enhancement statutes in light of R.A.V v. St. Paul69 At this hearing,
leading constitutional scholars testified that penalty enhancement
provisions do not violate the First Amendment.
70
B. State Statutes
There has been more progress at the state level than at the federal
level in treating violence against women as hate crime. Eleven states
and the District of Columbia now include gender in their hate crime
67. 113 S. CL at 2194. The Court found that the statute did not violate the defendant's
First Amendment rights because it was not designed to punish his bigoted beliefs, but rather to
redress special harms that are caused by hate crimes. Id. at 2199. Nor did the statute violate
his Fourteenth Amendment rights because it was not overbroad and thus did not have a chilling
effect on free speech. Id. at 2201.
68. Both the Wisconsin statute and the Congressional bills define hate crime as one in
which the perpetrator intentionally selects his victim based upon a particular protected
characteristic. Compare id. at 2197 n.1 (citing the Wisconsin hate crime statute) with S. 1522 and
H.R. 1152. In fact, the House bill was deliberately amended to include language that
"parallel[s] as much as possible" the Wisconsin statute's language. See 139 CONG. REC. H6793
(daily ed. Sept. 21, 1993) (statement of Rep. Hyde) (explaining that the purpose of the
amendment was to avoid constitutional challenges to the statute by having it comport with the
language upheld in Wisconsin v. Mitchell).
69. RA.V. v. St. Paul, - U.S. - 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992) (striking down an ordinance that
prohibited bias-motivated disorderly conduct on the grounds that it violated the First
Amendment).
The hearing concerned H.R. 4797, the Hate Crimes Sentencing Enhancement Act of 1992.
H.R. 4797, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992). See Hate Crimes Sentencing Enhancement Ac of 1992:
Hearing on H.R 4797 Before the Subcomm. on Crime and Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the
Judiciar, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) [hereinafter Hearing on H.1R 47971. H.R. 4797 is identical
in form to H.L 1152 as the latter was introduced in March 1993. Compare H.R. 4797 with H.R.
1152. H.R 4797 passed the House of Representatives by voice vote in October 1992, 138 CONG.
REc. H11,136 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1992), but died in the Senate.
70. While these arguments were made with regard to H.R. 4797, they are also applicable
to H.R. 1152 in spite of amendments to the latter, this means that H.R. 1152 will likely pass
muster under the First Amendment. See, e.g., Hearing on H.? 4797, supra note 69, at 18, 19
(statement of Floyd Abrams, Esq., Cahill, Gordon & Reindel, NewYork, NewYork) (stating that
while the government may not punish evil thoughts or ideas per se, it may consider evil motive
when fashioning a sentence); id. at 59, 64 (prepared statement of Bruce Fein, former Associate
Deputy Attorney General of the United States) (stating that under RA.V. v. St. Pau, a statute
may proscribe fighting words directed at protected groups and not violate the First Amendment
because the proscription is "ideologically neutral"); id. at 7, 10 (statement of Lawrence H. Tribe,
Professor of Law, Harvard Law School) (stating that H.R. 4797 is neither overbroad nor void for
vagueness); see also H.R REP. No. 981, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1992) (asserting that the First
Amendment is not "unduly burdened when otherwise protected statements are used at
sentencing as evidence to show that illegal conduct was motivated by hatred, bias or prejudice").
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statutes.71  Vermont's hate crime statute passed with virtually no
discussion about the inclusion of gender as a protected characteris-
tic.7 2 Similarly, a recent amendment to include gender" in an
Illinois hate crime statute passed through the legislature by over-
whelming margins in both legislative houses.
7 4
The remedies offered to women victims by state hate crime statutes
vary considerably. Of the states that include gender in their hate
crime statutes, six states and the District of Columbia offer civil
71. (1) CAL. PENAL CODE § 422.6(a)-(b) (West 1988 & Supp. 1993) (making it a crime to
injure a person, or a person's real or personal property, because of that person's gender); CAL.
CIV. CODE § 51.7(a) (West 1982) (providing that every person within the state has the right to
be free from gender-based violence against his or her person or property).
(2) CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-58(a) (West 1986) (declaring it a crime to violate a person's
constitutional rights based on that person's gender).
(3) D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-4001 (Supp. 1992) (defining a "bias-related crime" as a crime that is
of a certain class of designated criminal acts and that demonstrates the offender's bias towards
the victim's gender).
(4) ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-7.1(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992) (making it a crime for a
person to commit certain offenses against another person or person's property because of
gender).
(5) IOWA CODE ANN. § 729A.1 (West 1979 & Supp. 1993) (creating a civil rights provision that
protects a person's right to be free from violence or intimidation because of the person's
gender); id. § 729A.2 (defining "hate crime" as one where an offender commits certain types
of public offenses against an individual because of gender).
(6) KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15.331(1) (Baldwin Supp. 1992) (defining bias-related crime as an
offense which is either the result of or related to the victim's gender).
(7) MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 22C, § 32 (West 1992) (defining "hate crime" as a criminal
offense motivated by bias, which includes gender).
(8) MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.147b (1) (West 1992) (making intimidation or harassment of
a person because of that person's gender a crime).
(9) MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.2231(4(a)) (West 1987 & Supp. 1993) (declaring it a crime to
assault a person because of that person's sex); id. § 609.595(la), (2) (criminalizing damage to
property perpetuated because of the property owner's gender); id. 609.605(3) (prohibiting
trespass that is motivated by gender bias); id. § 609.746(3) (criminalizing interference with a
person's privacy because of that person's gender); id. § 609.79(la(a)) (making it a crime to
make obscene or harassing telephone calls which are motivated by the recipient's gender); id.
§ 609.795(2(a)) (declaring it a crime to use the mails in a harassing manner because of the
recipient's gender).
(10) N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651:6 (1955 & Supp. 1992) (allowing the state to extend the term
of imprisonment if the victim's gender "substantially motivated" the offender to commit the
crime).
(11) VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1455 (Supp. 1990) (defining "hate crime" as a crime that is
"maliciously motivated" by the victim's gender).
(12) W. VA. CODE § 61-6-21(a) to (c) (1992) (making it a felony to forcefully interfere with a
person's constitutional rights because of the person's gender, or to conspire to interfere with
those rights because of gender).
72. Telephone Interview with Judy Rex, Coordinator, Vermont Network Against Domestic
Violence and Sexual Assault (July 6, 1992).
73. H. 2065, 87th Gen. Ass., 1991 Reg. Sess., 1991 IlM. Legis. Serv. 2210 (West) (codified at
ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 38, paras. 12-7.1, 1005-5-3.2 (Smith-Hurd 1982 & Supp. 1992)) (including
as a hate crime the commission of certain criminal offenses by reason of the victim's gender).
74. Telephone Interview with Jan Schakowsky, Representative, State of Illinois General
Assembly (July 20, 1992). Representative Schakowsky introduced H. 2065.
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remedies.75 Nine states and the District of Columbia have statutes
that inflict criminal penalties: four states make the offense a misde-
meanor' and five states classify crimes motivated by bias as felo-
nies.77 New Hampshire and Vermont extend the imprisonment term
75. (1) CAL. CIV. CODE § 52(b) (West 1982 & Supp. 1993) (awarding actual damages plus
exemplary damages, a twenty-five thousand dollar civil penalty, and attorney's fees); id. § 52(c)
(authorizing the state Attorney General, a DistrictAttorney, City Attorney, or any aggrieved party
to file a civil action requesting an injunction, restraining order, or other preventive relief); id.
§ 52(d) (allowing the state Attorney General, or a District or City Attorney, to intervene when
a hate crime victim has filed a civil action alleging an equal protection violation under the
Fourteenth Amendment and the case is of "general public importance").
(2) CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-251b (West 1991) (allowing the recovery of costs and attorney's
fees in a civil action, but declining to create a new cause of action).
(3) D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-4004(a) (Supp. 1992) (providing hate crime victims a cause of action
for appropriate relief, including, but not limited to, an injunction, actual damages [including
damages for emotional distress], punitive damages, attorney's fees, and costs).
(4) ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-7.1(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992) (providing for an
independent civil action for actual and punitive damages [including emotional distress
damages], and injunctive or other appropriate relief).
(5) IOWA CODE ANN. § 729A.5 (West 1979 & Supp. 1993) (authorizing a civil action for
injunctive relief, general and special damages, attorney's fees, and costs for victims of hate
crimes).
(6) MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.147b(3) (West 1991) (creating a civil cause of action for
injunctive relief, actual damages, damages for emotional distress, and other appropriate relief).
Furthermore, a plaintiff who prevails in such an action may recover the greater of treble the
actual damages or two thousand dollars, attorney's fees, and costs. Id.
(7) VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1457 (Supp. 1990) (creating an independent civil cause of action
for compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive relief, costs, attorney's fees, and other
appropriate relief).
76. (1) CAL. PENAL CODE § 422.6(c) (West 1988 & Supp. 1993) (setting the punishment for
a hate crime violation at imprisonment in a countyjail for no more than one year, a fine of no
more than five thousand dollars, or both).
(2) CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-58(d) (West 1986) (establishing the penalty for a hate crime
that violates a person's civil rights and incurs no more than one thousand dollars in property
damages as a misdemeanor).
(3) IOWA CODE ANN. § 716.8.3 (West 1993) (providing punishments for "serious misdemeanor"
for trespass with the intent to commit a hate crime, and "aggravated misdemeanor" for trespass
to commit a hate crime which results in injury to a person or in damage of more than one
hundred dollars to any property).
(4) MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.2231(4) (West 1987 & Supp. 1993) (setting the penalty for a bias-
motivated assault in the fourth degree); id. § 609.595(2(b)) (establishing the penalty for
criminal damage to property in the third degree that is bias-motivated); id. § 609.605(3)
(making a bias-motivated trespass a misdemeanor); id. § 609.746(3) (adding the punishment of
misdemeanor for a bias-related invasion of privacy); id. § 609.79 (la(a)) (setting the punishment
for gender-based obscene or harassing telephone calls as a misdemeanor); id. § 609.795(2(a))
(establishing the penalty for using the mails for harassment purposes as a misdemeanor). The
penalty for all of these misdemeanor offenses is no more than one year in jail, a three thousand
dollar fine, or both.
77. (1) CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-58(d) (West 1986) (making a hate crime that violates
a person's civil rights because of gender a felony where the violation results in more than one
thousand dollars worth of property damage).
(2) ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-7.1(b) (Smith-Hurd 1992) (classifying hate crime as a Class
4 felony for a first offense, a Class 2 for subsequent offenses). Any probation or conditional
discharge may include a minimum of an extra two hundred hours of community service. Id.
(3) MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.147b(2) (West 1992) (setting the penalty for ethnic
intimidation as a felony punishable by up to two years in jail, a five thousand dollar fine, or
both).
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for hate-motivated crime.78 Four states increase penalties for repeat
offenders. 79 Four states have penalty enhancement power: Iowa and
the District of Columbia have penalty enhancement statutes, 80 while
Illinois and West Virginia treat hate crime as an aggravating factor at
the time of sentencing.81 Two states define hate crime as a civil
rights violation.82
Additionally, some state hate crime statutes contain provisions
governing data collection and law enforcement training. Eight states
and the District of Columbia mandate hate crimes data collection. 3
(4) MxNN. STAT. ANN. § 609.595(la(a)) (establishing the punishment for criminal damage to
property in the second degree as imprisonment for no more than one year and one day,
payment of a three thousand dollar fine, or both).
(5) W. VA. CODE § 61-6-21(b)-(c) (1992) (making it a felony to forcefully interfere with a
person's civil rights, the penalty for which is up to ten years in jail, a five thousand dollar fine,
or both).
78. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651:6 (1955 & Supp. 1992) (extending the penalty for
misdemeanor crime by two to five years); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1455(1) (Supp. 1990) (stating
that where the imprisonment penalty for a hate crime is ordinarily no more than one year it
shall be increased to no more than two years, a fine of no more than two thousand dollars, or
both).
79. (1) CAL. PENAL CODE § 422.7(c) (West 1988 & Supp. 1993) (increasing the penalty for
a person who has been previously convicted of committing, or conspiring to commit, a hate
crime to no more than one year in jail, no more than a ten thousand dollar fine, or both).
(2) CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-40a (West 1985, & Supp. 1993) (increasing the penalty for
"persistent offenders" by one offense level at the court's discretion). This means that if the
offense would ordinarily be punished as the most serious type of misdemeanor that it will now
be punished as the least serious type of felony. I&.
(3) ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-7.1(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992) (increasing the penalty by
two offense levels for the commission of subsequent hate crime).
(4) MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.2231(4(b)) (West 1987 & Supp. 1993) (creating a new punishment
for a hate-motivated assault that is committed within five years of a prior assault by increasing
the penalty to a maximum sentence of one year and one day, a three thousand dollar fine, or
both); id. § 609.747 (West Supp. 1993) (making it a gross misdemeanor for a person to harass
the same victim within six months of the first violation, where the harassment is bias-related).
80. (1) IOWA CODE ANN. § 712.9 (West 1979 & Supp. 1993) (classifying and punishing a
hate crime which violates individual rights as an offense which is one level higher than the
underlying offense); id. § 716.6A (classifying and punishing bias-motivated criminal mischief in
violation of individual rights as an offense which is one level higher than the underlying
offense).
(2) D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-4003 (Supp. 1992) (authorizing the court to sentence a hate crime
offender to no more than one and one-half times the maximum imprisonment and fine allowed
by the underlying offense).
81. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-5-3.2(a)(10) (Smith-Hurd 1982 & Supp. 1992)
(making a bias-motivated hate crime a factor in aggravation to be considered when imposing
an imprisonment term or when deciding whether to impose a more severe sentence); W. VA.
CODE § 61-6-21(d) (1992) (authorizing the court to consider the fact that a crime is bias-related
as an aggravating circumstance when the court imposes sentence).
82. CAL. PENAL CODE § 422.6 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993) (including hate crimes as a
violation in the exercise of individual rights); IOWA CODE ANN. § 729A.2 (West Supp. 1993)
(providing that hate crime offenses include violations of individual rights).
83. (1) CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 29-7m (West 1990) (ordering the state police who are
within the department of public safety to "monitor, record and classify" all bias-related crimes).
(2) D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-4002 (Supp. 1992) (ordering the Metropolitan Police force to afford
all victims of bias-related crimes the opportunity to submit a written report). The reports are
collected, compiled, and analyzed by the Mayor, who shall annually publish the results of this
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Five states mandate police training in the identification of hate
crime.14 Iowa requires sensitivity training for police and prosecu-
tors.' California suggests sensitivity training for offenders as a
condition of probation,86 and Illinois allows for a human relations
program in all public universities.
87
Interestingly, two states include gender in their hate crime statutes
for some purposes but not for others. Connecticut includes gender
in a civil rights statute that classifies bias crime as a misdemeanor,'
but does not include gender in a criminal statute enacted in 1990 that
analysis. Id.
(3) Act of June 29, 1992, ch. 293, 1992 Haw. Sess. Laws 754 (authorizing the state Attorney
General to develop a model for the specification and collection of data regarding hate crimes,
and to submit any appropriate findings, recommendations, and implementing legislation).
(4) ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 127, para. 55a(31) (Smith-Hurd 1993) (mandating the Department of
State Police to "collect and disseminate information relating to 'hate crimes'").
(5) IOWA CODE ANN. § 692.15 (West 1993) (requiring all law enforcement agencies to report
information on hate crimes to a bureau that generates crime statistics).
(6) KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17.1523 (Baldwin Supp. 1992) (creating the uniform offense report,
which is to be completed by all officers when investigating a bias-related crime).
(7) MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 220, §§ 33-35 (West Supp. 1992) (establishing a comprehensive
model for the collection of hate crime data).
(8) MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 28.257a (West 1992) (authorizing the regional chiefs of police
to report certain information regarding bias-motivated crime to the state police).
(9) MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.5531 (West Supp. 1994) (establishing a comprehensive system for
the collection of hate crime data. Investigating officers are required to complete reports on all
bias crimes, which are discussed and analyzed in monthly reports by local law enforcement
agency chiefs. The monthly reports are further summarized and analyzed in the annual report
to be filed by the commissioner of public safety.).
84. (1) CAL. PENAL CODE § 13,519.6 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993) (instructing the Commission
on Peace Officer Standards and Training to develop an instruction course related to hate
crimes).
(2) IOWA CODE ANN. § 80B.11 (West 1984 & Supp. 1993) (requiring that all law enforcement
officers complete a course on the "investigation, identification, and reporting" of all hate crime).
(3) KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15.331 (Baldwin Supp. 1992) (requiring biennial law enforcement
training courses to include a unit on bias-related crimes).
(4) MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 6, § 116B (West Supp. 1992) (authorizing the criminal justice
training council to provide instruction for all law enforcement personnel in "identifying,
responding to and reporting" all hate crime).
(5) MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.8451 (West Supp. 1994) (establishing a comprehensive training
system for all officers in identifying and responding to bias-motivated crimes). This system
includes training courses on violent crimes, and pre-service and in-service training requirements.
Id.
85. IOWA CODE ANN. § 729A.4 (West 1979 & Supp. 1993) (directing the prosecuting
attorneys' training coordinator to develop a sensitivity training course for police and prosecutors
to enable them to determine whether a civil rights violation has occurred).
86. CAL. PENAL CODE § 422.95(a) (West Supp. 1993) (deferring to the court's discretion
to decide whether a sensitivity training class, or "similar training in the area of civil rights,"
should be a condition of probation for an offender).
87. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 144, para. 189.21(a) (3) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992) (requiring all
public universities, among other things, to forward all reports of hate crime on their campuses
to the local state's attorney).
88. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-58(d) (West 1986) (making ita misdemeanor to deprive
a person of their constitutional rights because of gender). However, if the violation results in
property damage in excess of one thousand dollars, the violation is a felony. IR
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classifies intimidation based on bigotry or bias as a felony."9 Massa-
chusetts amended its Hate Crimes Reporting Act9 to include gender-
motivated hate crime in response to the murders of at least nineteen
women by their estranged husbands, ex-spouses, or boyfriends in the
first six months of 1992."' After signing the measure, Governor
William Weld stated, "We are seeing a disturbing pattern of violent
crime against women in Massachusetts .... By explicitly defining
gender prejudice as a hate crime, we are helping law enforcement
officials get a better handle on the dimensions of the problem and
focus resources where they're needed."92  Nevertheless, despite
Governor Weld's intent to define violence against women as hate
crime, the Massachusetts legislature did not amend the statutes
providing civil and criminal remedies for hate crime to include
gender.93
While eleven states and the District of Columbia include gender in
their hate crime statutes, interviews with women's rights advocates,
hate crime victims' advocates, and state attorney generals' offices in
these jurisdictions revealed no knowledge of instances in which these
statutes have actually been used in cases of violence against women.94
Minnesota's evaluation of its hate crime statute may offer insight into
why this is the case. In 1988, the Minnesota legislature mandated the
development of a training course for police officers, which was to
include written material to assist officers in distinguishing, under-
standing, and reporting hate crime.95 When Minnesota added
gender to its hate crime statute in May 1989,96 it also mandated the
89. Id. § 53a-181b(a) (classifying intimidation based on bigotry or bias against a person or
property because of the person's race, religion, ethnicity, or sexual orientation as a crime).
90. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 39 (West 1992).
91. Weld Signs Hate CrimeAmendmen4 UPI,June 3, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Curnws File.
92. Id.
93. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 39 (West 1992) (making intimidation of a person
based on that person's race, religion, ethnicity, or national origin a felony punishable by up to
two and one-half years imprisonment, a fine of at least five thousand dollars, or both).
94. Telephone Interview with Diane Alexander, Assistant Director of Library and
Information Services, National Victim's Center (July 6,1992); Telephone Interview with Loretta
Frederick, Attorney, Minnesota Battered Women's Coalition (July 6, 1992); Telephone Interview
with Ann Noel, Hearing Officer, California Fair Employment and Housing Commission and Bay
Area Hate Crimes Investigating Association (July 21, 1992); Telephone Interview with Judy Rex,
supra note 72; Telephone Interview with Elizabeth Shumann-Moore, Staff Attorney, Chicago
Lawyer's Committee for Civil Rights Under Law (July 20, 1992); Telephone Interview with John
Stein, Department Executive Director, National Organization for Victim Assistance (June 22,
1992).
95. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.5531, .8451 (West Supp. 1994) (mandating officer training
courses, as well as pre-service and in-service training requirements).
96. Act of May 25, 1989, ch. 261, 1989 Minn. Laws 892 (codified at MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 609.2231, .595, .605, .746, .79, .795 (West 1987 & Supp. 1993)) (amending sections of the code
which increase penalties for crimes that are bias-motivated to include gender).
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collection of data on all types of hate crime, including those crimes
that were motivated by gender-bias.97 However, the training materi-
als that Minnesota developed and the actual data collected on hate
crime indicate that the police have virtually ignored crimes motivated
by gender-bias.9" For instance, the information collected at hearings
and from testimony, and submitted to the Governor's Task Force on
Violence and Prejudice, indicated that through April 1988, gender-
biased crimes constituted 38.08% of all hate crimes reported.99 Yet
gender accounted for only 2% of the bias crimes reported to police
in 1988,1" 1.2% of those reported in 1989,11 and fewer than 1%
of those reported in 1990 and 1991.102 Moreover, at a May 1989
conference on bias-motivated crimes, over fifteen panelists from hate
crime advocacy organizations, local and national police investigation
units, and a gay and lesbian rights organization participated. 
1 3
There were, however, no panelists representing victims of rape or
domestic violence.1 ° Nowhere in the Summary Report, which was
prepared from presentations made at the conference, is there any
mention of gender-motivated hate crimes.105
Ill. OBSTACLES To TREATING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN As HATE
CRIME
As discussed in Part II, while some states have included gender in
their hate crime statutes, they have been either unwilling or unable
to fully implement these statutes so as to provide women with the
protection due to them under the statutes. Several possible reasons
for this failure in implementation are examined below.
97. Id. (codified at MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.5531 (West Supp. 1994)) (requiring the
reporting by law enforcement personnel of bias-motivated crimes).
98. See MINNESOTA BOARD OF PEACE OFFICER STANDARDS AND TRAINING, BIAS-MOTIVATED
CRIMES: INSTRUCrIONAL MATERIALS FOR I.AW ENFORCEMENT 29-30, 35 (1990) (defining a bias-
motivated crime as one which is motivated by the victim's race, religion, ethnicity, sexual
orientation, or gender but failing to instruct law enforcement to ask questions regarding
gender); SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 35, at 22, 35 (listing incidents of gender-based hate crime
reported to the Governor's Task Force and to law enforcement personnel).
99. SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 35, at 22.
100. SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 35, at 35.
101. SUaMARY REPORT, supra note 35, at 35.
102. Bias Offense Summary, supra note 35.
103. SUMMgfARY REPORT, supra note 35, at 43-57 (summarizing the remarks made during the
conference by the individual panelists).
104. SUMARY REPORT, supra note 35, at 43-57.
105. SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 35, at 43-57. Additionally, not one of the sources listed
in the Summary Report's bibliography appears to address violence against women. Id. at 83-87.
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A. Resistance From Hate Crime Victim Advocacy Groups And Judges
Advocates for victims of hate crime and judges often resist
accepting the fact that rape, domestic violence, and other violent
crimes against women should be treated as hate crime. The following
discussion demonstrates the ways in which this resistance has been
manifested.
1. The Argument That Inclusion Of Gender Will Stall Passage Of
Progressive Legislation And Implementation Of Hate Crime Statutes
The Hate Crime Statistics Act (HCSA) 10 ' directs the United States
Attorney General to collect data on crimes that "manifest evidence of
prejudice based on race, religion, sexual orientation, or ethnici-
ty"; °7 crimes motivated by gender bias are not included. The
Senate Judiciary Committee Report on one of the Senate companion
bills states that the purpose of this type of act is to provide informa-
tion about the incidence of hate crime to "help law enforcement
agencies and local communities combat hate crimes more effectively
by identifying their frequency, location, and other patterns over
time."'Os Advocates of the HCSA argue that it also raises public
awareness of hate crime and encourages the police to develop greater
"sensitivity to the particular needs of victims of hate crimes."0 9
The passage of the HCSA without the inclusion of gender as a
counted category illustrates the resistance on the part of hate crime
victim advocacy groups to recognizing violence against women as hate
crime. The enactment of the HCSA in its present form is the result
of strong lobbying efforts by the Coalition on Hate Crimes Preven-
tion, a group composed of religious, civil rights, gay and lesbian, and
law enforcement organizations.110 Although some member groups
of the Coalition wanted to lobby Congress to add gender as a catego-
106. See H.R. 1048, 101st Cong., ist Sess. (1989) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 534 (Supp. IV
1992)).
107. Id. These crimes include murder, non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, simple
and aggravated assault, intimidation, arson, and destruction or vandalism of property. Id. The
Attorney General is to develop guidelines for determining when such a crime is bias-motivated.
Id. In addition, the Bias Crimes Programs Establishment Act, H.R. 1437, 103d Cong., ist Sess.
(1993), directs the Attorney General to appoint a National Director of bias crimes, who would
develop instructions on how to comply with reporting requirements under the HCSA.
108. S. REP. No. 21, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.CA.N. 158, 158
(discussing S. 419, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989)).
109. Joseph M. Fernandez, Recent Development, Binging Hate rime Into Focus-The Hate
Crime Statistics Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-275, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L REV. 261, 263 (1991).
110. CENTER FOR WOMEN POUCY STUDIES, supra note 1, at 12; see Fernandez, supra note 109,
at 269-78 (discussing the efforts of the Coalition in pushing the Act through Congress, especially
when various Members objected to inclusion of sexual orientation).
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ry," the Coalition eventually decided against taking such action for
a number of reasons.
12
First, some member groups were concerned that lobbying for such
an addition would delay passage of the bill."' Additionally, it was
argued that adding gender would "open the door" to other groups,
such as the elderly or disabled,1 4 and thereby delay the passage
even further. In promoting these arguments to defeat the inclusion
of gender, the Coalition acted in its own interest and displayed
a surprising lack of empathy for the victims of violence against
women.
Second, most of the Coalition members felt that additional hearings
were needed to determine whether existing gender-based crime data
collection was deficient.1 6  Adding gender as a counted category,
it was argued, would not improve then-existing data collection of rape
and domestic violence." 7  Some member groups even suggested
that collecting any data on violence against women would be too
difficult because it is so pervasive"' and because, it was argued, such
violence is not the same as other types of hate crime." 9 However,
the Coalition should have known that the collection of data on rape
and domestic violence is sorely inadequate in terms of both figures
111. At no time did the Act ever include gender. See Fernandez, supra note 109, at 275-81
(describing how H.R. 1048 was amended before being passed by Congress, but never to include
gender). Those organizations that urged the addition of gender to it were predominantly
women's advocacy groups. CENTER FOR WOMEN POLICY STUDIES, supra note 1, at 13.
112. Fernandez, supra note 109, at 275 (stating that the Coalition considered and rejected
expanding the statute to include gender).
113. CENTER FOR WOMEN POLICY STUDIES, supra note 1, at 13.
114. CENTER FOR WOMEN POLICY STUDIES, supra note 1, at 13.
115. The bill was largely supported and promoted by four distinct lobbying groups, all of
which had their own interests and agendas in ensuring the passage of the bill. The first group
was a loosely connected alliance of organizations that were expressly created to fight racial,
ethnic, and religious hate crime, such as the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) and the Anti-Klan
Network. Fernandez, supra note 109, at 269-70. The second group was a coalition of gay and
lesbian organizations. Id. at 270-74. The third group consisted of unassociated civil liberties
organizations, such as the ACLU. &L at 272. The final group was a confederation of law
enforcement agencies. Id. at 274. The exclusion of national multi-issue women's organizations
was noticeable. See Marie de Santis, Hate Crimes BillExudes Women, OFF OUR BACS,June 1990
(noting the "absence of any women's groups" from the Coalition).
116. See Fernandez, supra note 109, at 275 n.74 and accompanying text (summarizing
Fernandez's telephone interviews with Sue Armsby, a Lobbyist for People for the American Way,
and Kevin Berriil, Director of the Anti-Violence Project of the National Gay and Lesbian Task
Force).
117. Fernandez, supra note 109, at 275.
118. CENTER FOR WOMEN POLICY STUDIES, supra note 1, at 13.
119. CENTER FOR WOMEN POLICY STUDIES, supra note 1, at 13. An example of the belief that
gender-based hate crime differs from other hate crime is that, because female victims of hate
crime sometimes have a prior relationship with their attacker, they are not interchangeable in
the way that other hate crime victims are. I. (citing an argument made by the ADL against
including gender in hate crime statutes). The issue of a victim's interchangeability is explored
further in Part 1I1, infra notes 128-137 and accompanying text.
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and methods used. 2 1 Moreover, rape and domestic violence are
not the only crimes against women that are motivated by gender
hatred. Like racial minorities and gays and lesbians, women are the
victims of such crimes as murder, assault, battery, and intimidation,
simply because they are women.
12 1
Third, women's rights groups in Washington could not agree
whether including gender in the statute would be "the appropriate
way to count gender-based crime." 22  However, almost two years
before the HCSA was enacted, the National Organization for Women
(NOW) had come out strongly in favor of including gender as a
enumerated category."z NOW and the National Coalition Against
Domestic Violence (NCADV) even met several times with the
Coalition to discuss the inclusion of gender in the bill.2 4  Even
eight months prior to the bill's enactment, the two groups had
sponsored several meetings of various organizations to discuss gender
inclusion." Clearly there was strong, well-organized support among
these groups for including gender in the bill.
120. To begin with, it is difficult to determine the actual number ofviolent crimes that are
committed against women every year, because women often fail to report them to police.
CENTER FOR WOMEN POLICY STUDIES, supra note 1, at 6 (stating that statistics on reported crime
"represent a substantial undercount of actual violence against women"); see Finn, supra note 5,
at 9 (explaining that many bias crime victims fail to report the crime to police because the
victim distrusts the police, feels the crime was minor, believes that the police cannot "do
anything" about the crime, has a language barrier, or fears retaliation from the perpetrator if
the crime is reported).
But even if all violent crimes against women were reported to the police, the federal
government is unable to compile meaningful statistical data on these crimes because offlaws in
its data collection system. See CENTER FOR WOMEN POLICY STUDIES, supra note 1, at 6-8
(discussing problems with data collection on information concerning violence against women).
Furthermore, at the time that the bill was passed, no "working models or police protocols"
existed at the state or local level for identifying gender-motivated hate crimes as actually being
hate crime. Fernandez, supra note 109, at 275 n.4.
121. CENTER FOR WOMEN POLICY STUDIES, supra note 1, at 8.
122. Fernandez, supra note 109, at 275.
123. SeeYard testimony, supra note 4, at 264 (urging the amendment of S. 2000, one of the
Senate companion bills to H.R. 1048, to include gender). MollyYard testified before the Senate
inJune 1988. Id. However, Congress did not enact the bill until April 1990. 136 CONG. REC.
H1460 (daily ed. Apr. 4, 1990) (concurring in the Senate amendment to H.R. 1048).
124. Memorandum from Nancy Buermeyer, Director, Lesbian Rights, NOW, to the NOW
Executive Committee I (Dec. 15, 1988) (on file with TheAmerican UnivenityJournal ofGender &
theLaw) (discussing NOW and NCADV's December 1988 meeting with the Coalition). However,
the Coalition notified NOW and NCADV that a poll had been taken and that the Coalition
member-groups had decided unanimously to not include gender, thereby cancelling any future
meetings. de Santis, supra note 115.
125. Letter from Nancy Buermeyer, Director, Lesbian Rights, NOW, and Janet Nudelman,
Public Policy Advocate, NCADV, to organizations supporting the inclusion of gender in the bill
(Aug. 28, 1989) (on file with The Ameican UniversityJournal of Gender & the Law) (referring to
an August 1989 meeting of"feminist" organizations concerning the inclusion of gender in the
bill, and inviting additional organizations to participate in a September 1989 forum on the same
subject).
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Ironically, the Coalition argued that "[w]ithout the inclusion of
sexual orientation in the act, there would be two standards. Crimes
against gays and lesbians would be viewed as less significant, less
pervasive, and less reprehensible than crimes motivated by racial,
religious, or ethnic prejudice."" 6 That a coalition of religious, civil
rights, and gay and lesbian organizations should fail to see that their
actions relegated crimes against women to the same secondary
position illustrates one of the major obstacles that women's advocates
must overcome before violence against women will be treated as hate
crime.
2. The Argument That Women Are Not Interchangeable In The Same Way
As Other Hate Cime Victims
Interchangeability is important to hate crime victims' advocates.
They argue that hate crime should be punished more severely, at least
in part because such crime has a greater impact on the particular
community to which the victim belongs. 7 A particular community
is more affected by a hate crime that is motivated by the victim's
membership in the community, because the victim could be inter-
changed with any other member of the group. Therefore, other
members of the community may live in fear that such a crime could
happen to them."' Similarly, women fear for their own safety when
another woman in the community is the victim of a violent crime,
whether the attacker is known to the woman or is a stranger.
Female victims of violent crime often have a prior relationship with
their attackers. 9 For some commentators, the existence of a prior
relationship between victim and perpetrator is the only factor that
should determine how the legal system addresses violence against
women. 30 if a woman has a prior relationship with her attacker,
they would argue, then she is not "interchangeable" as are victims of
racial and other hate crimes.
126. Fernandez, supra note 109, at 274 (citingJohn H. Buchanan, Chairman, People for the
American Way Action Fund, from his remarks in ajune 7, 1990 press release).
127. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (noting that bias crimes against an individual
because of that person's membership in a particular group affect the entire group who share
that immutable characteristic because such bias crime is intended to intimidate that particular
group of people).
128. Finn, supra note 5, at 10 (finding that the fear that hate crimes generate can "victimize
a whole class of people").
129. CENTER FOR WOMEN POLICY STUDIES, supra note 1, at 12 (stating that women who are
victimized are often victimized by "close associates").
130. CENTER FOR WOMEN POLICY STUDIES, supra note 1, at 13 (citing a memo by the Civil
Rights Division of the Anti-Defamation League, which says that crimes against racial and ethnic
groups are interchangeable because a crime against a member of one of these groups sends a
message to the entire group but that rape victims may not be interchangeable).
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In an interview, Richard Cohen, the Legal Director of the Southern
Poverty Law Center, the umbrella organization for Klanwatch, offered
an explanation for the position that women are not perceived to be
interchangeable in the same manner as victims of racial and other
hate crime.'1' In his effort to illustrate that violence against women
does not have the same effect on the community as violence against
racial and ethnic minorities, Cohen asked me to compare two
hypotheticals. In the first, a caucasian male writes "I'm going to get
you nigger" on the door of an African-American's home. In the
second, a male writes "I'm going to get you bitch" on the door of a
woman's home. Cohen argued that the second example would not
threaten women in the community because it is directed at a specific
individual and not at women in general. I countered that it would
threaten women in the community because "bitch," like "nigger," is
a derogatory term that applies to a sub-group of the population. By
using the term "nigger" or "bitch," the aggressor signifies that it is the
victim's ethnicity or femaleness that he sees as prominent. If I were
to see the statement "I'm going to get you bitch" on a door in my
neighborhood, I would assume that there is a man in the vicinity who
hates women and I would fear encountering him.
In a similar vein, the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith
(ADL), a leader in the hate crime victims' movement, advocates that,
because many women have a prior relationship with their attackers,
they are not interchangeable like other victims of hate crime.1
3
1
The ADL has stated that "the relationship between individual
perpetrator and victim is the salient fact-whether the defendant is
a women-hater in general is irrelevant:" 3 The ADL has not only
refused to support the inclusion of gender in hate crime statutes, but
has actually testified against it."34
In conclusion, both Richard Cohen and the ADL assume that when
women have a prior relationship with their assailants, they are neither
interchangeable nor perceived to be interchangeable; therefore,
violence against women does not have the same impact on the
community as other hate crime. Remarkably, these advocates appear
completely unaware of the arguments feminist advocates and theorists
131. Telephone Interview with Richard Cohen, Legal Director, Southern Poverty Law Center
(Aug. 5, 1992).
132. CENTER FOR WOMEN PoucY STUDIES, supra note 1, at 13.
133. CENTER FOR WOMEN POLICY STUDIES, supra note 1, at 13.
134. Susan R. Boyle, Legislative News, MASS. LAW. WKLY., May 25, 1992, at 23 (noting that the
ADL, one of the original drafters of the Massachusetts hate crime reporting law, testified against
a proposal to modify the law to include gender because "domestic violence and rape cases would
draw attention from crimes involving bias").
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have been making for decades-that rape and domestic violence
victims are interchangeable in the minds of their attackers'3 5 and
that women alter their lifestyles in numerous ways to avoid male
violence because they fear such violence happening to them. 6
3. Persistent Sexism Among Judges
Another obstacle to treating violence against women as hate crime
is the persistence of sexism among judges. This hurdle emerged in
the debate about passage of the 1991 Senate version of the Violence
Against Women Act.' In a statement opposing the civil rights
remedy granted by the Act,38 the Conference of Chief Justices
stated, by implication, that granting legal remedies for family violence
cases will allow women to misuse the law by making false legal claims,
and that granting a federal civil rights remedy for hate violence
against women will choke the federal courts with domestic relations
issues.'39 The Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court,
William Rehnquist, shares this view."4°
The Conference of Chief Justices maintains that family policy is a
sensitive issue that should be reserved to the states, and that the
remedies offered in the Violence Against Women Act would contra-
135. See supra note 4 (discussing the interchangeable nature of female victims of violent
crime).
136. Margaret Gordon and Stephanie Riger interviewed women and men living in several
large cities to assess how fear of violence affects their lives. The authors' study found that 68.4%
of the women, but only 5.4% of the men, never go to bars and clubs alone. Further, 47% of
the women, but only 7.5% of the men, said that they never go downtown alone after dark.
MARGARET T. GORDON & STEPHANIE RIGER, THE FEMALE FEAR 15 (1989), cited in CENTER FOR
WOMEN POLICY STUDIES, supra note 1, at 11.
137. S. 15, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R. 1502, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
138. The civil rights remedies contained in the 1991 version of the Act are substantially
similar to those contained in the 1993 version. Compare S. 15, § 301 with S. 11, §§ 301-304
(providing, in both bills, victims of gender-based crimes of violence with the right to sue for
compensatory and punitive damages and for injunctive or declaratory relief). Thus, arguments
against these remedies apply to the 1993 Act as well.
139. Violence Against Women: Victims of the System: Hearings on S. 15 Before the Senate Comm. on
theJudiciary, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 314, 315 (1991) [hereinafter Hearings on S. 151 (prepared
statement of Hon. Vincent L. McKusick, President, Conference of ChiefJustices) [hereinafter
McKusick statement]:
If, as it appears to be the case, Section 301(c) permits civil suits against male relatives,
particularly against husbands or intimate partners, it can be anticipated that this right
will be invoked as a bargaining tool within the context of divorce negotiations and add
a major complicating factor to an environment which is often acrimonious as it is.
Id.
This opinion demonstrates the gender bias of the ChiefJustices. They ignore the fact that
a civil rights remedy will allow women to pursue legitimate claims against their abusers. They
also ignore a primary reason victims want to be in federal court-the unwillingness of state
courts to remedy their wrongs.
140. SeeJack Sirica, Federal Protection of Women at Issue, NENSDAY, Feb. 16, 1992, at 17 (noting
that Rehnquist told the American Bar Association that the "proposed civil rights protections for
women would 'unnecessarily expand' the jurisdiction of federal courts").
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dict state law.'4 ' This statement clearly reflects the assumption that
family violence should be treated differently from other violence.
TheJustices fail to grasp that it is precisely because state remedies for
victims of gender-motivated hate crime are inadequate, in both theory
and practice, that a federal civil rights remedy was deemed neces-
sary. 14
B. The Debate Over Increased Penalties Versus Treatment For Sex
Offenders
As previously discussed in Part II, the Senate version of the Violence
Against Women Act of 1993 (VAWA) contains a provision calling for
penalty increases and enhancements for certain defendants that are
convicted of sex offenses." While a number of prominent multi-
issue women's rights organizations endorse the Senate bill,'" still
other such organizations oppose the bill because of these penalty
provisions." Some of these opponents favor treatment programs
for sex offenders over increased punishment."16  The resulting
debate over treatment versus incarceration has divided the women's
advocacy community.
In September 1990, the Task Force on the Violence Against Women
Act"1 7 began meeting to promote the Senate version of the Violence
141. McKusick statement, supra note 139, at 317 (arguing that Title III will override "state
laws on damages and civil suits between spouses").
142. S. RE . No. 138, supra note 47, at 49 (noting that "[traditional [s]tate law sources of
protection have proved to be difficult avenues of redress for some of the most serious crimes
against women"); S. REP. No. 197, supra note 13, at 43 (noting that crimes that disproportion-
ately affect women are often treated "less seriously" by the courts than comparable crimes
against men). For example, certain court practices, such as the "prompt complaint" rule, deter
victims from reporting and prosecuting crimes of violence and put the victim on trial. S. REP.
No. 197, supra note 13, at 45-46. Finally, stereotypes of crime victims prevent them from
receiving equal treatment by the courts. Id. at 46-48 (discussing the problem of victim-blaming
in rape cases).
143. S. 11, 103d Cong., Ist Sess. §§ 111-112 (1993); see supra note 58 and accompanying text
(explaining the provisions of the bill).
144. Those organizations that support the bill include, among others, Center for Women
PolicyStudies, Ms. Foundation forWomen, National Coalition AgainstDomestic Violence, NOW,
National Women's Health Resource Center, and National Women's Political Caucus. See List
of Organization Endorsements, Violence Against Women Act of 1993 (as of Oct. 13, 1993) (on
file with The American UnivenityJoumal of Gender & the Law).
145. For example, the National Women's Law Center and Women's Legal Defense Fund
support neither the Senate nor the House version of the VAWA. Id
146. Statement of NOMAS, VAWA Title I: Treating Sex Offenders: Concerns (on file with
The American UniversityJoural of Gender & the Law) [hereinafter Statement ofNOMAS] (stating
that "when we consider battery, rape, or child abuse, the thought quickly moves to the issues of
treatment for the offenders").
147. The Task Force is a coalition of women's advocacy groups dedicated to crafting and
promoting the bill. Letter from Sally F. Goldfarb, Senior StaffAttorey, NOW Legal Defense
and Education Fund, to organizational supporters of the VAWA (Sept. 13, 1990) (on file with
The American Univerity Journal of Gender & the Law) (enclosing minutes from the Task Force's
1994] HATE CRIME STATUTES
Against Women Act of 1991.'4 Certain members of the Task Force
immediately raised concerns about several provisions that increased
penalties for convicted sex offenders;'49 such penalty increases, it
was argued, would have a disproportionate effect on communities of
color.150 As a result, some Task Force member organizations
refused to support the bill.'5 ' Despite this opposition, substantially
similar penalty provisions were carried over to the succeeding bill, the
Violence Against Women Act of 1993.152
In February 1993, Representative Patricia Schroeder introduced the
House version of the Violence Against Women Act.'53 This bill does
not contain a penalty increase provision; instead, it provides grants to
develop treatment programs for sex offenders.'54 A similar provi-
sion in the 1991 House bill"5 received a great deal more support
than the 1991 Senate bill.'56 As of the time that this article was
written, it was too early to tell which 1993 version of the bill would
September 1990 that describe the Task Force and its function). Specifically, the Task Force
assists in drafting the Act, mobilizes support for the bill and any amendments to it, and educates
the public about the bill to ensure its passage. Id.
148. S. 15, 102d Cong., lst Sess. (1991).
149. S. 15, §§ 111, 112. Section 111 provides that repeat sex offenders may receive up to
twice the imprisonment and/or fine otherwise provided in the guidelines. Similarly, section 112
increases penalties for rape and aggravated rape by at least four offense levels.
150. See Minutes from the December 18, 1990 Meeting of the Task Force on the Violence
Against Women Act 2-4 (Dec. 18, 1990) (on file with the American UniversityJournal of Gender &
the Law) [hereinafter Task Force Minutes] (suggesting that a number of Task Force members
opposed the sentencing provisions because of their disproportionate effect on minorities). Two
factors contribute to this disproportionate effect. First, because Indian reservations are the most
populated areas subject to federal jurisdiction, Native Americans also are the largest group of
people to be affected by the penalty increase provisions. See Hearings on S. 15, supra note 139,
at 299, 300 (prepared statement of Peg Rogers, Attorney, Native American Rights Fund) (stating
that Native Americans will "bear the weight" of the provisions). Second, the danger of selective
prosecution means that members of minority groups would be punished in greater proportion
than those of non-minority groups. Id. at 295, 295 (prepared statement of The Women's Circle)
(noting that "the law is followed to the letter" when used against Native Americans and other
minorities).
151. See Task Force Minutes, supra note 150, at 3 (noting that during one meeting of the
Task Force, it was determined that "[i]f the Task Force supported increased sentences, many
groups could not support the bill"). These groups also stated that they would "lobby against the
sentencing provision and not support the bill as a whole" if the provision remained in the bill.
Id. at 4.
152. CompareS. 15, § 111 with S. 11, § 111 (making, in both bills, a subsequentsexual offense
punishable by a term of imprisonment up to twice that which is authorized by statute or by the
sentencing guidelines).
153. H.L 1133, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
154. Id. § 121(a).
155. Compare H.R 1502, § 112 (requiring that all federal sex offenders participate in a
treatment program within 30 days of entering prison) with H.R 1133, § 127 (requiring the
United States Attorney General to ensure that community treatment information is made
available to released sex offenders).
156. SeeList of Organization Endorsements, Violence Against Women Act of 1991 (as of Oct.
29, 1992) (on file with The American University Journal of Gender & the Law) (indicating that 34
organizations supported only the House version while twelve supported only the Senate version).
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receive more support. However, it is conceivable that another such
split could occur.
Concern about increasing incarceration for rapists has led the Task
Force on the Violence Against Women Act to form a subcommittee
to explore the possibility of treatment for sex offenders.' Interest-
ingly, it is the sole men's group involved in the Task Force, the
National Organization for Men Against Sexism (NOMAS), that has
highlighted the apparent contradiction between labeling certain acts
"hate crime" and maintaining that the perpetrators of such crime can
be treated. 5 NOMAS argues that treating sex offenders from a
healing perspective, rather than from a criminal justice perspective,
reinforces the erroneous belief that sex offenders are different from
other hate crime perpetrators and merely require treatment.' In
fact, much of the work of anti-rape advocates has focused on
countering the image of rapists as sick individuals who should spend
time in therapy and, instead, promoting the notion that these
individuals should be treated as perpetrators of violent crime who
deserve to spend time in jail.1"
Promoting treatment as a response to violence against women has
distracted women's advocates from the task of promoting the VAWA.
As a practical matter, the treatment/incarceration debate has split the
women's advocacy community. The opposition that some women's
organizations have toward the increased penalties provision signifies
their discomfort with the underlying premise of hate crime statutes
that contain penalty enhancement provisions-that is, that increased
penalties are desirable.
16 1
C. The Argument That Male Violence Against Women Affects Women
Differently
As discussed in Part III, concern exists that increased penalties for
convicted sex offenders have a disproportionate effect on communi-
157. Telephone Interview with Rus Ervin Funk, Coordinator, Men's Anti-Rape Resource
Center, National Organization for Men Against Sexism (NOMAS) (July 6, 1992). NOMAS is a
member of the Task Force subcommittee.
158. Statement of NOMAS, supra note 146.
159. Statement of NOMAS, supra note 146 (stating that no other hate crime legislation
mandates treatment of hate crime offenders, and suggesting that treatment for offenders of the
Violence Against Women Act undermines its characterization as a hate crime).
160. Statement of NOMAS, supra note 146. A more acceptable option might be to permit
"sensitivity training," the way that California does, as a condition of probation for all hate crimes.
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 422.95 (West Supp. 1993). This option focuses on confronting the
assailant's desire to dominate women as a whole rather than focusing on the assailant's
individual problem of "controlling" his sexuality.
161. For example, national women's organizations have not endorsed the Hate Crimes
Sentencing Enhancement Act. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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ties of color.16 Therefore, while it is tempting to assume that male
violence against women plays the same role in all women's lives and
that all women believe that an increased judicial response to violence
against women is desirable and/or effective, such an assertion is
essentialist.
163
The anti-essentialist critique of feminism maintains that mainstream
feminist legal theory assumes that there is an "essential 'woman'"
beneath the race, class, and sexual orientation differences that
distinguish women from one another.' Feminist theorists who
speak of a single women's voice or experience view women's interests
as the same and the fate of all women as being bound together.165
However, it is argued, the single women's voice that is spoken is that
of the caucasian woman. 66 In this way, mainstream feminism
ignores the experiences of women of color.6 7
In particular, feminism has been charged with essentialism in its
theories on rape. Some African-American feminists argue that
African-American women and caucasian women have had, and
continue to have, very different experiences of rape, giving rape a
different meaning for the two groups.168 For instance, Angela
Harris asserts that for African-American women rape is a far more
complex experience than it is for caucasian women, for it is rooted in
racism. 69 On the one hand, while rape laws historically were used
in a racist fashion to single out African-American men for the rape of
162. See supra note 150 and accompanying text (discussing the effect that penalty increase
provisions have upon Native American communities).
163. The theory of gender essentialism asserts that a "monolithic 'women's experience'"
exists that can be isolated and described independently of such factors as a woman's race, class,
or sexual orientation. Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN.
L. REv. 581, 588 (1990).
164. See id. at 591. Angela Harris also discusses the work of Robin West as an example of
mainstream feminist legal theory that is based upon essentialism. Id. at 602-05.
165. For example, Catharine MacKinnon argues that society is constructed along gender
lines, with women being dominated by men. CATHARINE A. MACKiNNON, Desire and Power, in
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 46, 51 (1987) (stating that gender is "a matter of dominance, not
difference"). Thus, in spite of their different situations, women are linked to each other by
their membership in a subordinated gender class. Id. at 56.
166. ELIZABETH V. SPELMiAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST
THOUGHT 4 (1988) (asserting that mainstream feminism's description of women 'as women'
is almost always a description of middle-class women from western industrialized countries);
Harris, supra note 163, at 588 (stating that most feminist legal theorists who claim to speak for
all women are caucasian, heterosexual, and from socio-economically advantaged backgrounds).
167. Angela Harris explains that essentialism requires that some voices be silenced to benefit
the woman who speaks for all women. Harris, supra note 163, at 585. Those silenced voices are
"the same voices silenced by the mainstream legal voice of [the country]-among them, the
voices of black women." Id.
168. Harris, supra note 163, at 598.
169. Harris, supra note 163, at 598.
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caucasian women, 7 ' the laws did at least provide formal protection
to caucasian women.'' On the other hand, the law did not even
recognize the rape of an African-American woman as a crime until
after the Civil War. 72  Even after the Civil War, the laws were
seldom used to protect these women, because African-American
women were considered to be naturally promiscuous.'73
The intersection of rape and racism continues today.74 Statistics
show that African-American men are more likely to receive harsher
penalties for rape than caucasian men, 175 and that all men are
treated less harshly when the rape victim is African-American. 176 As
a result, when an African-American woman is raped by an African-
American man and reports her rape to the police, she is exposing
herself, and her assailant, to a criminal justice system that is both
170. Harris, supra note 163, at 598 (quoting Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism,
Method, and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635, 646 n.22 (1983)); Jennifer
Wriggins, Rape, Racism, and the Law, 6 HARV. WOMEN'S LJ. 103, 106 (1983) (discussing the
selective recognition" of only one type of rape-that of a caucasian woman by an African-
American man). The mere allegation that an African-American man raped a caucasian woman
sometimes led to his lynching by a mob; a conviction brought castration or death. Wriggins,
supra at 105. Caucasian men accused of raping caucasian women were subjected to far less
severe penalties. Id. at 106 n.15.
171. But see Wriggins, supra note 170, at 107 (noting that traditional common law barriers
protected most caucasian rapists from prosecution for raping caucasian women).
172. Harris, supra note 163, at 599; Wriggins, supra note 170, at 118.
173. See Sharon A. Allard, Rethinking Battered Woman Syndrome: A Black Feminist Perspective, 1
UCLA WoMEN's LJ. 191, 199-200 (1991) (stating that because African-American women were
deemed to be "immoral," they were undeserving of legal protection from sexual exploitation).
174. This commingling extends into distant areas. For example, the myths and stereotypes
about African-American women that justified their sexual abuse during slavery affects their
experience of sexual harassment in the workplace. See Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Whose Story Is It
Anyway? Feminist and Antiracist Appropriations of Anita Hill, in RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING
POWER 402 (Toni Morrison ed., 1992). The first result is that the sexual harassment of African-
American women is often used to note the woman's "subordinate racial status." Id. at 412-14.
For example, while both caucasian and African-American women may be objectified as "pieces,"
insults directed at African-American women may often be prefaced with "nigger," "black," or
other words that call attention to the woman's race. Id. The second result is that courts may
be less likely to believe African-American women's reports of harassment. See id. (noting that
because an African-American woman was not expected to be chaste, she was considered less
likely to be truthful and thus her testimony was less likely to be believed by judges and jurors).
Therefore, mainstream feminism should recognize this difference in women's experiences, and
develop alternative narratives of sexual harassment that are grounded in African-American
women's experiences as well. See id. at 435 (stating that "[n]onwhite and working-class women
... must see their own diverse experiences reflected in the practice and policy statements of
these predominantly European-American middle-class groups").
175. For example, between 1930 and 1967, 89% of the men executed for rape in the United
States were African-American. Harris, supra note 163, at 600 (citing SUSAN ESTRCH, REAL RAPE
107 n.2 (1982)).
176. African-American men continued to be treated more harshly"when charged with raping
white women ... (than] with raping black women." DIANA SCULLY, UNDERSTANDING SEXUAL
VIOLENCE: A STUDY OF CoNv crED RAPISTS 145 (1990) (citing Gary D. LaFree, TheEffect of Sexual
Stratfication by Race on Official Reactions to Rape, 45 AM. Soc. REv. 842 (1980)); see also Wriggins,
supra note 170, at 121-22 (stating that bothjudges and caucasianjurors impose lighter sentences
where the victim is African-American).
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racist and sexist 77 This reality has led some commentators to
question the goal of mainstream feminism to increase the number of
rape convictions, arguing that it would merely serve to reproduce the
problem of disparate punishments between African-American and
caucasian rapists.
1 78
It has also been argued that mainstream feminism is essentialist in
its treatment of domestic violence. Some feminists believe that
African-American women experience male violence differently from
caucasian women, giving violence against women a different meaning
for the two groups.179  This difference in meaning, it is argued, has
been ignored by mainstream feminists. 8 ° Instead, the efforts of
mainstream feminism on behalf of battered women have been based
on caucasian women's experiences.'8 The resulting feminist legal
theory on woman-battering issues, such as coercive intervention in
177. For example, many African-American women remain silent about experiences of sexual
abuse out of fear that their stories will be used to "reinforce stereotypes of black men as sexually
threatening." Crenshaw, supra note 174, at 415. Even African-American women who do not
share this fear may choose not to testify against African-American men because they fear
ostracism from those who do share this view. Id.
In addition, Crenshaw states that the African-American community has not fully addressed
intra-racial rape and "other abusive practices," partly because of a reluctance to expose internal
conflict that could, in turn, reflect negatively on the rest of the community. Id. at 420. The
effect of this "code of silence" is to coerce women into keeping quiet for fear of being labeled
a traitor to their race. Id. at 420-22 (noting that many accounts of the Anita Hill/Clarence
Thomas Senate hearings portrayed Hill as a traitor to African-American people for testifying
against Thomas).
178. Wriggins, supra note 170, at 138.
Angela Harris takes this argument one step further, arguing that caucasian feminists have not
only ignored the racist use of rape, but in fact have perpetuated it as well. She relates an
example where Susan Brownmiller, a caucasian feminist, describes the African-American
defendants in a rape trial as "'pathetic, semiliterate fellows'" and the caucasian female accusers
as "innocent pawns of white men." Harris, supra note 163, at 601 (quoting Brownmiller, supra
note 1, at 237). Thus, the contemporary feminist analysis of rape explicitly relies on racist
ideology to minimize caucasian women's complicity. Id.
179. See Crenshaw, supra note 174, at 414. Crenshaw states that "[b]lack women experience
much of the sexual aggression that the feminist movement has articulated but in a form that
represents simultaneously their subordinate racial status." Id.
180. See ANGELA Y. DAVIS, WOMEN, CULTURE AND PoLrTcs 45 (1990) (discussing the
reluctance of African-American, Latina and Native American women to join the anti-rape
movement of the early 1970s because the feminist theoretical foundations for the campaign
failed to "develop an analysis of rape that acknowledged the social conditions that foster sexual
violence as well as the centrality of racism in determining those social conditions"). Davis states
that "since much of the early activism against rape was focused on delivering rapists into the
hand of the judicial system, Afro-American women were understandably reluctant to become
involved with a movement that might well lead to further repressive assaults on their families
and their communities." Id. at 44.
181. See ANDREA DwORKIN, WOMAN HATING 21-22 (1974) (stating that most of the women
who were involved in the early stages of feminism were caucasian and middle class). As a result,
most of them, and hence the movement, faled to take any action that would harm their
privileged lifestyle. Id.; see Schneider, supra note 3, at 532 (noting that, until recently, the
battered women's movement, a sub-group of the feminist movement, was "largely shaped by the
experiences and understanding of white women").
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family matters8 2 or battered woman syndrome, 8 3 may not address
the experiences of African-American women at al."
Despite the fact that women as a group suffer from male violence,
a variety of factors influence a woman's decision to seek assistance
from the criminal justice system. Obviously, race is one factor that
should not be ignored." However, it is essentialist to assert that
182. Catharine MacKinnon has argued that the privacy doctrine shields battery and marital
rape when they occur inside the home. MacKinnon states that certain alternatives for women
are precluded by conditions of sex, race, and class before a legal doctrine is chosen, ensuring
that "the existing distribution of power and resources within the private sphere will be precisely
what the law of privacy exists to protect." CATHARINE A. MACINNON, Roe v. Wade: A Study in
Male Ideology, in ABORTION: MORAL AND LEGAL PERsPECnTvEs 45, 53 (Jay L Garfield & Patricia
Hennessey eds., 1984) [hereinafter MACKINNON, Roe v. Wade]. According to Dorothy Roberts,
MacKinnon's argument is an example of how mainstream feminist legal theory "focuses on the
private realm of the family as an institution of violence and subordination." Dorothy E. Roberts,
Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privay, 104
HARV. L REV. 1419, 1470 (1991) (citing MACKINNON, Roe v. Wade, supra at 51-53). However,
Roberts argues, women of color often focus on the family as the "site of solace and resistance
against racial oppression." Id. at 1470-71; see also ELMER P. MARTIN &JOANNE M. MARTIN, THE
BLACK EXTENDED FAMILY 1 (1978) (noting the importance of the family to African-Americans
for psychological and material support). Thus, women of color may view domestic violence less
as a type of abuse within the private sphere (the battering) and more as a potential abuse in the
public sphere (the government intervention); cf Roberts, supra at 1471 (asserting that in the
area of reproductive rights, many African-American women are more concerned about coercive
government intervention than about abuse in the private sector).
183. Battered woman syndrome is characterized by a cyclical pattern of psychological and
physical abuse which may be divided into three stages, those of tension-building, acute battering,
and reconciliation. LENORE E. WALE.R, THE BATTERED WOMAN 55-70 (1979). The syndrome
is based upon the idea that the woman suffers from "learned helplessness," a state of
psychological paralysis where she feels incapable of escaping the battering relationship. Id. at
47-48.
However, at least one commentator has noted that battered woman syndrome is built on a
definition of woman which is based on "limited societal constructs of appropriate behavior for
white women." Allard, supra note 173, at 192-94. Moreover, African-American women must
hurdle the additional stereotype asserting that they do not deserve the protection under the
syndrome because of their race. See id. at 199-200 (noting that in the Victorian era, African-
American women were deemed to be "immoral." This stereotype was used to further the
perception that these women did not deserve legal protection from sexual exploitation.).
184. For example, "[wiomen of color may believe that the means to ending their abuse is
to end racial oppression, not gender subordination. The battered women's movement as it has
been constructed may not speak to their experiences at all." Schneider, supra note 3, at 532
nA6.
185. In reality, mostAfrican-American women, like most caucasian women, are raped by men
of the same race. Statistics show that 90% of rapes are intra-racial. MacKinnon, Sex Equality,
supra note 2, at 1300 n.90 (citing MENACHEM AMIR, FORCIBLE RAPE 44 (1971)). A recent
Department ofJustice study shows that "in rapes with one offender, 7 of every 10 white victims
were raped by a white offender, and 8 of every 10 Black victims were raped by a Black offender."
Id. (citing CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, FEMALE VICTIMS OF VIOLENT CRIME 10 (1991)).
Furthermore, the percentage of African-American women who experience sexual assault is
similar to that of caucasian women. Note, for example, the percentage of women who reported
being victimized at least once by rape or attempted rape: caucasian (non-Jewish), 45%; Jewish,
50%; African-American, 44%; Latina, 30%; Asian, 17%; Filipina, 17%; Native American, 55%;
and other, 28%. DIANA E.H. RUSSELL, SEXUAL EXPLOITATION: RAPE, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE, AND
WORKPLAcE HARASSMENT 84, tbl. 3.3 (1984).
Additionally, African-American women may be more likely than women of other racial and
ethnic groups to report their rapes. In one study, 20% of rapes overall were reported. Out of
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race is the only factor that influences women's decisions about
whether to seek out judicial intervention186 or to assert that all
women of a particular race feel the same way about judicial interven-
tion.187 Feminists, in particular, should allow policy decisions to be
guided by the voices of the women who have actually been the victims
of male violence."t Through personal work experience, I have
encountered many women of color who believed that their abuse
should be treated as seriously as violent crime between strangers; who
wanted their abusers to be prosecuted to the full extent of the law;
and who chose to take advantage of all legal remedies, both civil and
criminal." 9 Advocates should listen to the voices of women from
diverse backgrounds to ensure the availability of all possible remedies.
Individual women can then choose the appropriate remedy.
D. The Argument That Domestic Violence Should Be Treated Differently
From Other Hate Crime
The argument that the interests of domestic violence victims may
be better served by training police and prosecutors to address the
specific problems of domestic violence, rather than by treating
domestic violence as the more general problem of hate crime, has
some merit. Victims of domestic violence are different from victims
of other hate crime in that they often maintain an intimate relation-
these, 17% of the rapes of African-American women were reported, 9% of the rapes ofJewish
women, 8% of the rapes of Asian and Filipina women, 7% of the rapes of caucasian non-Jewish
women, and 0% of the rapes of Native American women. Id. at 100.
186. For instance, one study found that, regardless of race, victims of rape were most likely
to seek judicial intervention when their homes were broken into, they were raped by a stranger,
they were threatened with a weapon, or they were subject to a "high degree of violence."
RuSSELL, supra note 185, at 96-98.
187. Joan Williams has noted that the sameness/difference debate has divided the African-
American community, as well as the feminist community. Joan C. Williams, Dissolving the
Sameness/DfferenceDebate: A Post-Modern Path Beyond Essentialism in Feminist and Critical Race Theory,
1991 DUKE LJ. 296, 297. Williams offers a post-modem formulation of "difference" in which
"[c]laims of difference simply mean that in some contexts gender or race may shape (or even
determine) one's outlook. This reformulation of difference... avoids essentialism because it
refuses to concede that race, gender-or, indeed, any given category-will always be
determinative." Id. at 307 (emphasis in original).
188. The idea that women's voices are silenced under patriarchy and that feminism should
therefore look to individual women's experiences is not new. Id. at 320 (advocating that
women's "personal narrative" be used "to enable women to communicate what they see as basic
realities").
189. My experiences include volunteering as a hotline counselor at a shelter for battered
women; serving as the shelter's house manager, counseling women seeking Civil Protection
Orders through the Civil Victim's Advocacy Project of the D.C. Coalition Against Domestic
Violence; surveying over one thousand intrafamily offense cases for the D.C. Task Force on
Gender Bias in the Courts; and representing battered women as a student attorney with The
American University Women and the Law Clinic.
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ship with their attackers following a battering incident. 9 ' Through-
out my experiences working with police and prosecutors on behalf of
battered women,'9 ' I found that this single factor completely guided
the former's approach to reports of domestic violence. They
responded with either disbelief-if she stayed then the alleged
violence must not have occurred-or with the belief that the abused
woman would not follow through with the prosecution of her case.
This resistance by police, prosecutors, and judges to treating domestic
violence as a crime has been, in fact, well documented.192 There-
fore, given their special biases against battered women, law enforce-
ment personnel need to be educated about the dynamics of relation-
ships in which domestic violence takes place. Only with this educa-
tion will law enforcement officials be able to understand domestic
violence as an expression of hatred toward women 9 and be moti-
vated to prosecute domestic abusers to the full extent of the law.
It might appear that in those few jurisdictions that have already
developed an adequate law enforcement response to domestic
violence, including gender in hate crime statutes would not help, and
might even harm, domestic violence victims. This issue recently arose
in Connecticut, where domestic violence advocates have been training
law enforcement officials on how to properly respond to domestic
disturbances.' When the possibility of including gender in a
pending hate crime statute arose, Connecticut NOW and the
190. Some victims choose to continue living with their batterers. Some reasons why a victim
stays include: the batterer pleads and promises to reform; he threatens, and/or performs,
further acts of violence if she leaves him; the victim has no place else to go; the children still
live in the home; and the victim feels love or sorrow for the batterer. DEL MARTIN, BATERED
WIVES 72-86 (1976) (citing a 1975 survey of battered women). Even if the victim does leave her
batterer, in some cases she will continue to maintain a contact with him. For example, the
victim and batter may have a child in common and thus need to maintain a non-intimate
relationship.
191. See supra note 189.
192. See S. REP. No. 138, supra note 47, at 44 (stating that there is "widespread gender bias
in the courts," especially regarding domestic violence cases). A California task force on gender
bias in the courts has reported that every element of the Californiajustice system, from police
to judges, treats domestic violence victims "as though their complaints were trivial, exaggerated
or somehow their own fault." Id. at 46 (citing to the findings of the Administrative Office of the
Judicial Council of the Courts of California); cf Carolyne R. Hathaway, Case Comment, Gender
Based Discrimination in Police Reluctance to Respond to Domestic Assault Complaints, 75 CEO. LJ. 667,
672 (1986) (addressing the fact that prosecutors are slow in responding to domestic violence
complaints and that judges do not impose meaningful sanctions in domestic violence cases).
193. CENTER FOR WOMEN POLICY STUDIES, supra note 1, at 10 (discussing wife abuse as a
"motiveless" crime of domination and control. "In virtually all of these cases, the 'motive' is
hatred and anger at women, and a desire to control [women], acted out on a particular
woman.").
194. Telephone Interview with Betty Gallow, Lobbyist for the Connecticut Civil Liberties
Union, Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Rights, and Connecticut Coalition Against Domestic
Violence (Aug. 4, 1992).
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Connecticut Coalition Against Domestic Violence decided not to
advocate the inclusion of gender in the statute.195 The group was
concerned that the police, who had already been trained to respond
to domestic violence calls in one manner, would become confused,
and therefore less effective, if required to treat domestic disturbances
as hate crime incidents.1
96
The inclusion of gender in hate crime statutes does not, however,
preclude legislatures from offering more specific guidance to law
enforcement officials about how to address domestic violence. Hate
crime statutes already include special guidelines for addressing
violence against gays and lesbians, women, the mentally and physically
disabled, the elderly, and members of unpopular political groups.
97
Therefore, there is no reason why guidelines and training programs
which states have already developed for fighting domestic violence
cannot be incorporated into a state's program for addressing hate
crime.
E. The Argument That Hate Crime Statutes Will Be Used Against Women
Another argument against including gender in hate crime statutes
is that these statutes may be used against domestic violence victims if
not specifically restricted to crime against recognized subordinate
groups. For instance, in some cases police have responded to
mandatory arrest statutes198 by arresting both parties; as a result,
mandatory arrest statutes that were intended to protect the victim
often become a second form of abuse for the victim. 99 Therefore,
hate crime statutes that do not specifically state that they can only be
used against a member of a dominant group by a member of a
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text (describing the groups that are covered
by state hate crime statutes).
198. Mandatory arrest statutes require the police to arrest the primary physical aggressor
when they have probable cause to believe that a felony or misdemeanor domestic assault has
occurred. Sarah MausolffBuel, Mandatoy Arrest forDomestic Violence, 11 HARV. WOMEN'S LJ. 213,
214-15 (1988).
199. Professor Catherine Klein has stated that
[a] major area of concern surrounding mandatory arrest laws has been dual arrests,
which occur when the victim is arrested along with the abuser. A dual arrest is rarely
appropriate in domestic violence cases... [Nevertheless,] in somejurisdictions, usually
during the initial implementation period of a mandatory arrest policy, dual arrests have
occurred all too frequently. There appear to be two main reasons: some police
officers, resenting the loss of some of their discretion, were trying to sabotage the
mandatory arrest law;, and some officers, because of inadequate training, genuinely
misunderstood the provisions of the law.
Catherine F. Klein, Domestic Violence: D.C. 's New Mandatory Arrest Law, WASH. LAW., Nov./Dec.
1991, at 24, 27-28.
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subordinate group may pose a particular threat to battered women,
who are normally in a subordinate position to their batterers.200 As
previously discussed in the context of racial discrimination in Part I,
if both dominant and subordinate groups can use these statutes, then
statutes created to protect subordinate groups may in fact be used
against them by dominant groups.0 1
One solution to this problem is to provide law enforcement officials
with adequate training about the purpose of hate crime statutes and
to explain the reasoning behind the legislature's decision to curtail
their discretion by creating special reporting and arrest guidelines for
hate crimes. 2  Another solution to this problem is to monitor
prosecutorial decisions, as suggested in Part 1.203 Together these
measures help ensure that the subordinate members of society are not
further injured by the very laws that are designed to protect them.
F The Argument That Proving Gender Bias Is Difficult
Another obstacle to progress in the states on treating violence
against women as hate crime is confusion about how to prove
motive.2°4 Discussions with advocates in states that include gender
in their hate crime statutes indicated that there is interest in using
these statutes in cases involving violence against women.2"5  Howev-
er, these advocates expressed concern that there were no guidelines
for demonstrating that a particular act of violence against a woman
was motivated by gender bias."'6
Concern about proving motive should not, however, be a barrier to
using hate crime statutes to protect women. Motive can be difficult
200. See WALKER, supra note 183, at 34-35 (discussing the "traditionalist orientation" of the
battered woman, and noting her subordination to her husband in the marriage, her home, her
career, her financial position, and her other relationships).
201. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text (discussing problems associated with the
enforcement of race-based hate crime statutes).
202. For example, somejurisdictions have amended mandatory arrest laws to ensure that the
police arrest only the primary aggressor in situations where both parties have used violence, thus
protecting the subordinate party. "In determining who was the primary aggressor, the officer
was to take several factors into account, including the relative degree of injury inflicted by both
parties and the existence of a prior history of violence." Klein, supra note 199, at 28.
203. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text (discussing bias among prosecutors as a
primary obstacle to the use of race-based hate crime statutes by minorities, and offering two
possible solutions).
204. See Finn, supra note 5, at 13-14 (listing proof of bias motive as the main problem in
prosecuting hate violence).
205. Telephone interview with Loretta Frederick, supra note 94; telephone interview with
Ann Noel, supra note 94; telephone interview withJudy Rex, supra note 72; telephone interview
with Elizabeth Shumann-Moore, supra note 94.
206. Telephone interview with Loretta Frederick, supra note 94; telephone interview with
Ann Noel, supra note 94; telephone interview withJudy Rex, supra note 72; telephone interview
with Elizabeth Shumann-Moore, supra note 94.
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to prove for any hate crime."0 7 However, mere difficulty in proving
motive has not prevented the legal system from punishing hate crime
based on characteristics other than gender. For example, proving
motive is perceived as a major obstacle in race-based hate, crime
prosecutions, yet race-based hate crime is successfully prosecuted.208
There are a number of sources of guidance for proving motive.
One source is federal employment discrimination law. The Senate
Judiciary Committee Report on the Violence Against Women Act of
1993 states that Title VII employment discrimination cases are to
provide federal prosecutors with standards for establishing motive in
gender-based hate crime.2ta
A second source is the National Institute of Justice of the United
States Department of Justice's guidelines, which list factors to be
considered in determining whether a crime is motivated by bias. 1'
These factors include the following: common sense; language (for
example, use of racial epithets); severity of harm; lack of provocation;
previous history of similar events in the area; and absence of motive
(for example, battery without robbery) .21' The guidelines could
easily be applied in cases of gender bias: sexist slurs are often made
during attacks on women; lack of provocation and severity of harm
might be demonstrated in a case where a man pummels his wife for
burning the dinner; and absence of motive is apparent when a woman
is assaulted on the street or in her home and her assailant makes no
attempt to rob her.
207. Finn, supra note 5, at 13 (noting that a potential bias crime may lack the necessary
"physical evidence, verification of bias language used by the alleged offender, or reliable
witnesses" to prove that it is bias-motivated); Fleischauer, supra note 36, at 701 (arguing that
"prosecutors fice the difficultburden of proving notonly the elements of the original crime and
the disparate races ... of the victim and the offender, but also that the reason or motivation
for the crime itself was racist in nature").
208. Finn, supra note 5, at 11-13, 14 (describing the success of state task forces on bias crime
and special prosecution units in prosecuting bias cases).
209. S. REP. No. 138, supra note 47, at 52-53 (stating that because the "definition of gender-
motivated crime is based on [Tlitle VII," case law discussions of Title VII "will provide substantial
guidance to the trier of fact in assessing whether the requisite discrimination was present").
210. CENTER FOR WOMEN POUCY STUDIES, supra note 1, at 9.
211. CENFER FOR WOMEN POLI-'Y STUDIES, supra note 1, at 9.
212. A more difficult question is whether all rapes should be treated as hate crime. One
commentator has suggested that there should be a presumption that every rape is a hate crime,
but that the defendant can rebut this presumption by demonstrating some other motive for the
rape. Wendy L Willis, Note, The Gun is Always Pointe& Sexual No lence and Title I of the VMolence
Against Women Act; 80 GEo. LJ. 2197, 2206 (1992) (stating that rape is "almost always gender-
motivated").
Under Willis' proposed scheme, the plaintiff has the initial burden of making a prima facie
case that there was sexual contact with the defendant and that it occurred under coercive
circumstances. Id. at 2217. Once met, the burden shifts to the defendant to raise voluntary
consent as an affirmative defense. Id. If the plaintiff then proves sexual assault by a
preponderance of the evidence, the court presumes that the assault was gender-motivated. Id.
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In conclusion, while the application of these guidelines and the
standards developed in Title VII cases might seem unusual at first,
especially in domestic violence cases, difficulty in proving motive in
gender-based hate crime should not deter advocates from pressuring
prosecutors to use these statutes on behalf of women.
I. POTENTIAL BENEFITS To TREATING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
As HATE CRIME
Two important benefits exist for treating violence against women
as hate crime. Together they more than outweigh the arguments
against such treatment discussed in Part III.
A. Valuable New Legal Remedies For Female Victims Of Violence
The strongest argument for classifying violent acts against women
that are motivated by gender bias as hate crime is that hate crime
statutes offer legal remedies that are not presently available to women.
For example, while rape and sexual assault statutes provide criminal
remedies for crimes involving specified sexual acts between strangers,
these statutes often offer less severe penalties when the victim and the
assailant are acquainted, and perhaps offer no penalties when the
victim and the assailant are married."3 Furthermore, domestic
violence statutes offer injunctive relief to victims of violence who are
either married to, or involved in long-term relationships with, their
attacker, but do not offer relief to other female victims of male
violence. 14 Treating violence against women as hate crime would
close these gaps.
Including gender in hate crime statutes offer women the following
additional remedies. First, by upgrading assaults from misdemeanor
to felony status, penalty enhancement statutes provide a much needed
incentive for police and prosecutors to take violent crimes against
women seriously.215 Second, including gender in hate crime statutes
213. SeeRobin West, EquaHly Theo7y, Marital Rape, and the Promise of the Fourteenth Amendment,
42 FtA. L REV. 45, 46 (1990) (explaining that severe sexual assault laws that exempt, or provide
lighter sentences for, marital rape, deny victims their Fourteenth Amendment right to equal
protection of the law).
214. For instance, in the District of Columbia, Civil Protection Orders are only available for
committed or threatened intrafhmily offenses. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-1003, -1004 (1989).
Intrafamily offenses are limited to criminal acts committed upon a person "to whom the
offender is related by blood, legal custody, marriage, having a child in common, or with whom
the offender shares or has shared a mutual residence; and with whom the offender maintains
or maintained an intimate relationship..." D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1001(5) (A)-(5) (B) (1989 &
Supp. 1993).
215. Arrest and prosecution rates in domestic violence cases are notoriously low. For
instance, while over twelve hundred women petitioned for Civil Protection Orders in the District
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offers women the opportunity to seek civil remedies and enhanced
criminal penalties for bias-motivated acts of violence perpetrated by
casual acquaintances and strangers, regardless of whether the acts are
explicitly sexual. Third, damages awarded in civil suits provide the
financial assistance that some victims of bias-motivated violence need.
As the result of an attack, some victims suffer from emotional trauma
so severe that they are temporarily or permanently unable to support
themselves. In cases of sexual assault, victims collect damages in less
than 1% of the cases. 216  There were only 255 trial verdicts over a
ten-year period in civil rape cases. 217  It is even more difficult for
women to seek civil damages if they are married to their attacker; not
all states permit civil suits between spouses or permit them only in
limited circumstances. 218  Fourth, civil suits offer an important
of Columbia in 1989, only 22 court jackets indicated that criminal cases were pending. District
of Columbia Courts, Final Report of the Task Force on Racial and Ethnic Bias and Task Force
on Gender Bias in the Courts 123-24 n.199 (1992) [hereinafter D.C. Gender Bias Task Force
Report]. The District of Columbia police receive approximately nineteen thousand domestic
violence calls each year. SandraJ. Sands; Karen Baker & Naomi Cahn, Report on District of
Columbia Police Response to Domestic Violence 1, 54 (Nov. 3, 1989) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with The American UniversityJournal of Gender & the Law). Yet in 1986, only 42 written
police reports were taken. Id. This means that there were no more than (and possibly less
than) 42 arrests. Id.
216. Jury Verdict Research, Inc., cited in S. REP. No. 197, supra note 13, at 44 n.43.
217. Jury Verdict Research, Inc., cited in S. REP. NO. 197, supra note 13, at 44 n.43.
218. The common law doctrine of interspousal tort immunity prohibited suits between a
husband and wife, on the grounds that such suits
disturb the harmony of the marital relationship; they involve the courts in 'trivial'
disputes between spouses; they encourage fraud and collusion between spouses;
criminal and divorce law provide adequate remedy; [and] the defendant is rewarded
for his wrong, since he stands to recover some of the judgement if the parties
cohabitate.
NationalWoman Abuse Prevention Project, Victim Compensation:An Old Remedy Opens NewAvenues
for Battered Women, 3 THE EXCHANGE 1, 4 (1989). The following states have abrogated this
doctrine in whole, unless otherwise noted parenthetically.
(1) Penton v. Penton, 135 So. 481, 483-84 (Ala. 1931).
(2) Cramer v. Cramer, 379 P.2d 95, 97 (Alaska 1963).
(3) Fernandez v. Romo, 646 P.2d 878, 880-83 (Ariz. 1982) (en banc) (abrogating the doctrine
for vehicular tort actions only).
(4) Leach v. Leach, 300 S.W.2d 15, 17 (Ark. 1957).
(5) Klein v. Klein, 376 P.2d 70, 71-72 (Cal. 1962) (en banc).
(6) Rains v. Rains, 46 P.2d 740, 742-44 (Colo. 1935).
(7) Brown v. Brown, 89 A. 889, 890-91 (Conn. 1914).
(8) Beattie v. Beattie, 630 A.2d 1096, 1098-101 (Del. 1993).
(9) FLA- SrAT. ANN. ch. 741.235 (Harrison Supp. 1992); Waite v. Waite, 618 So. 2d 1360,1361-62
(Fla. 1993).
(10) Harris v. Harris, 313 S.E.2d 88 (Ga. 1984) (abrogating the doctrine only in situations where
there is "realistically speaking, no 'marital harmony' to be protected by application of the
interspousal immunity rule... [nor] any hint of collusion between the [husband and wife] or
of intent to defraud an insurance company").
(11) HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-28 (1993).
(12) Rogers v.Yellowstone Park Co., 539 P.2d 566,571-72 (Idaho 1975) (abrogating the doctrine
for vehicular tort actions only); Lorang v. Hays, 209 P.2d 733, 737 (Idaho 1949) (abrogating the
doctrine in intentional tort actions only).
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emotional reward for victims: establishing the "guilt" of their
attacker.219  Finally, statutes that define violent acts against women
as civil rights violations offer victims of gender bias-motivated violence
confirmation that their suffering is part of a greater, and regretfully
unaddressed, social problem of violence against women. In this sense,
(13) ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 1001 (Smith-Hurd 1993).
(14) Brooks v. Robinson, 284 N.E.2d 794, 798 (Ind. 1972).
(15) Shook v. Crabb, 281 N.W.2d 616, 619-20 (Iowa 1979) (abrogating the doctrine for personal
injury actions only).
(16) Flagg v. Loy, 734 P.2d 1183, 1189-90 (Kan. 1987).
(17) Brown v. Gosser, 262 S.W.2d 480, 481-84 (Ky. 1953).
(18) MacDonald v. MacDonald, 412 A.2d 71, 75 (Me. 1980).
(19) Boblitz v. Boblitz, 462 A.2d 506, 522 (Md. 1983) (abrogating the doctrine for negligence
actions-only); Lusby v. Lusby, 390 A.2d 77, 89 (Md. 1978) (abrogating the doctrine for
intentional tort actions only).
(20) Lewis v. Lewis, 351 N.E.2d 526,532-33 (Mass. 1976) (abrogating the doctrine for vehicular
tort actions only).
(21) Hosko v. Hosko, 187 N.W.2d 236, 237-38 (Mich. 1971).
(22) Beaudette v. Frana, 173 N.W.2d 416, 420 (Minn. 1969).
(23) Burns v. Burns, 518 So.2d 1205, 1209 (Miss. 1988).
(24) Townsend v. Townsend, 708 S.W.2d 646, 650 (Mo. 1986) (en banc) (abrogating the
doctrine as to intentional tort actions only).
(25) MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-2-109 (1993); Noone v. Fink, 721 P.2d 1275, 1276 (Mont. 1986).
(26) Imig v. March, 279 N.W.2d 382, 386 (Neb. 1979).
(27) Rupert v. Stienne, 528 P.2d 1013, 1017 (Nev. 1974) (abrogating the doctrine for vehicular
tort actions only).
(28) Gilman v. Gilman, 95 A. 657, 657 (N.H. 1915).
(29) Merenoffv. Merenoff, 388 A.2d 951, 960-62 (N.J. 1978).
(30) Maestas v. Overton, 531 P.2d 947, 948 (N.M. 1975).
(31) N.Y. GEN. OBLUG. LAw § 3-313 (McKinney 1989); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Westlake,
324 N.E.2d 137, 139 (N.Y. 1974).
(32) N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 52-5, -5.1 (1991); Crowell v. Crowell, 105 S.E. 206, 208-10 (N.C. 1920).
(33) Fitzmaurice v. Fitzmaurice, 242 N.W. 526, 527-29 (N.D. 1932).
(34) Shearer v. Shearer, 480 N.E.2d 388, 392-94 (Ohio 1985).
(35) Courtney v. Courtney, 87 P.2d 660, 665-70 (Okla. 1938).
(36) Antonacci v. Davis, 816 P.2d 1202, 1203 (Or. Ct. App. 1991).
(37) Hack v. Hack, 433 A.2d 859, 868-69 (Pa. 1981).
(38) Digby v. Digby, 388 A.2d 1 (RI. 1978) (abrogating the doctrine for vehicular tort actions
only).
(39) Pardue v. Pardue, 166 S.E. 101, 103 (S.C. 1932).
(40) Scotvold v. Scotvold, 298 N.W. 266, 268-69 (S.D. 1941).
(41) Davis v. Davis, 657 S.W.2d 753, 759 (Tenn. 1983).
(42) Price v. Price, 732 S.W.2d 316, 319 (Tex. 1987).
(43) Stoker v. Stoker, 616 P.2d 590, 590-92 (Utah 1980).
(44) Richardv. Richard, 300 A.2d 637,641 (Vt. 1973) (abrogating the doctrine for vehicular tort
actions only).
(45) Surratt v. Thompson, 183 S.E.2d 200, 201-02 (Va. 1971) (abrogating the doctrine for
vehicular tort actions only).
(46) Freehe v. Freehe, 500 P.2d 771, 773-76 (Wash. 1972) (en banc).
(47) Coffindaffer v. Coffindaffer, 244 S.E.2d 338, 343-44 (W. Va. 1978).
(48) Wait v. Pierce, 209 N.W. 475, 480-81 (Wis. 1926).
(49) Tader v. Tader, 737 P.2d 1065, 1069 (Wyo. 1987).
219. National Woman Abuse Prevention Project, supra note 216, at 5.
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civil rights remedies promote one of the fundamental tenets of
feminism-the personal is political. 0
B. Increased Public Awareness Of The Seriousness And Prevalence Of
Violence Against Women
The use of hate crime statutes in cases of violence against women
focuses attention on the root of the crime-hatred. There are two
potential benefits to focusing on the hatred involved in violence
against women. First, treating violence against women as a hate crime
may direct emphasis away from the sexual nature of certain bias-
motivated acts of violence against women, such as rape. In the minds
of many, rape is simply the result of a misguided sexual urge.2
This perception is problematic because it immediately diverts
attention away from the perpetrator and toward the victim.2 2 2 The
extent to which juries accept culturally supported "rape myths"
demonstrates this problem .2  Three of these myths-that rape is
an expression of sexual desire; that women invite sexual assault by
their dress, behavior, or decision to be alone in the "wrong" place;
and that a woman's prior consensual sexual relations with the accused
implies consent-confuse rape with sex. The effect of these myths is
to "shift the focus from the perpetrator to the victim from the very
moment the offense takes place."224 Instead of looking for evidence
that the rapist hates women, juries are led to look for indications that
220. MACKINNON, THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 1, at 120. After explaining what "the
personal is the political" does not mean, MacKinnon stresses women's powerlessness next to
men. She states that it "means that gender as a division of power is discoverable and verifiable
through women's intimate experience of sexual objectification, which is definitive of and
synonymous with women's lives as gender female. Thus, to feminism, the personal is
epistimologically the political, and its epistemology is its politics." Id.
221. Richard T. Andrias, Rape Myths 7 A.BA. Crim.Just. 3, 3 (1992).
222. Id.
223. Richard Andrias, a New York State Supreme Court Justice, lists seven common rape
myths:
" The true victim of a rape will immediately seek out and complain to family, friends,
or the police.
" Rape usually occurs at night, out of doors, and between strangers; the perpetrator
uses a weapon and leaves the victim physically injured.
* Rape is an expression of sexual (albeit misplaced) desire.
Women falsely accuse men of rape.
* The woman invited the sexual assault by her dress, behavior, or being alone in the
wrong place.
SA woman's prior consensual sexual relations with the accused (or with others known
to the accused) implies consent.
* A woman impaired by drugs or alcohol deserved to be raped.
Id.
224. Id.
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the woman either consented or gave the appearance of consent.
2 25
A logical step toward treating rape as an expression of power and
dominance 221 is to divorce sex from rape where possible.
227
Second, viewing violence against women as hate crime might deflect
the emphasis away from the relationship between the perpetrator and
victim. 228  Just as the misperception that rape is a crime of sex
impedes the prosecution of sex crimes against women, the mispercep-
tion about the significance of the relationship between victim and
assailant also serves as a barrier to effective prosecution.2 Treating
violence against women as hate crime emphasizes the tremendous
significance of the violence.
I CONCLUSION
Hate crime statutes offer a promising tool for fighting violence
against women. As discussed in Part I, gender is now included in
legislative efforts to combat hate crime on both the state and federal
levels. State statutes that provide women with civil rights remedies,
and mandate data collection and special police training, are becoming
increasingly prevalent.
Nevertheless, a variety of obstacles have stalled the inclusion of
gender in hate crime statutes and the implementation of hate crime
statutes in cases of violence against women. First, there is resistance
on the part of hate crime victims' advocates and others to the
inclusion of gender in hate crime statutes. In their efforts to keep
gender out of hate crime statutes, these advocates have overlooked
much feminist scholarship concerning violence against women.
225. SeeS. REP. No. 138, supra note 47, at 45-46 (asserting that the "'pervasive suspicion of
rape victims' credibility,'" and persistentvictim-blaming by court and law enforcement personnel,
move the focus in hate crime cases "from the attacker-where it should be-to the behavior of
the victim") (citation omitted).
226. GORDON & RIGER, supra note 136, at 45 (saying that feminists argue rape keeps women
afraid, dependent on men, and subservient).
227. One example of the effort to divide rape and sex is a recent movement on the part of
police and prosecutors to change the names of their specialized units from "sex crimes" to
"special victims." Andrias, supra note 223, at 4.
228. See supra note 130 and accompanying text (noting that opponents to treating hate
violence against women as hate crime believe that existence of a relationship between the victim
and perpetrator means that a victim is not interchangeable with other women). Focusing on
their relationship impedes focusing on the fact that rape is violence against women as a group.
Id.
229. In response to a survey by the D.C. Task Force on Gender Bias in the Courts, 50% of
respondents stated that they believed bail was set lower in domestic violence cases than in "other
cases of similar violence"; 70% of the respondents with an opinion stated that when the parties
are married, sentences are generally shorter than in "other similar cases"; and 50% of the
respondents with an opinion stated that sentences in domestic violence cases are shorter than
"other similar cases," even when the parties are not married. D.C. Gender Bias Task Force
Report, supra note 215, at 126.
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Second, national multi-issue women's organizations have expressed
ambivalence over whether lengthening incarceration periods is an
appropriate response to male violence. This ambivalence is primarily
the result of concern that lengthening incarceration periods will
disproportionately impact communities of color due to racism in the
American criminal justice system. Furthermore, it has been argued
that increased judicial intervention in cases of violence against women
may not be desirable to women of color. However, although sexual
violence may have a different meaning for many African-American
women due to the racist use of rape laws in this country, the
argument that all African-American women do not want an effective
criminal justice response to crimes of violence against them is
essentialist and therefore ignores the individuality of these women.
Feminist advocates should listen to the voices of victims of male
violence to determine whether to support increased penalties for
gender-based hate crime. In response to the claim that treating
domestic violence as hate crime might be less effective, it cannot be
denied that the inclusion of gender in hate crime statutes does not
preclude legislatures from creating more specific responses to
domestic violence. Finally, the confusion in the states about how to
demonstrate motive in cases of hate-based violence against women
should not preclude prosecution of these cases. Since motive is always
difficult to demonstrate in hate crimes, advocates should lobby for
application of pre-existing motive determination guidelines in cases
involving women.
In conclusion, the potential benefits of the use of hate crime
statutes for women outweigh the concerns that have arisen. Hate
crime statutes offer completely new legal remedies for women.
Moreover, by focusing attention on the general hatred of women that
violent acts motivated by gender bias demonstrate, these statutes
could help overcome the two major barriers to prosecuting hate-
motivated violence against women by de-emphasizing the significance
of the relationship between the victim and her assailant and directing
attention away from the sexual nature of so many violent crimes
against women. Now more than ever, it is critical that women's
advocacy groups become, or remain, involved in the fight to include
violence against women in hate crime statutes.
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